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96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018)

CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION*
KAIPONANEA T. MATSUMURA**
Approximately fifteen percent of the adult population in the
United States—more than 35 million people—are in informal
intimate relationships. In contrast to the highly regulated marital
relationship, unmarried partners largely evade laws that turn on
relationship status. This invisibility has benefits and costs:
partners can walk away from the relationship without
burdensome judicial involvement, but they also miss out on laws
that create joint property ownership or provide survivor benefits
upon death. Most courts and scholars agree that the law should
extend some rights and obligations to people in nonmarital
relationships, but they have struggled to solve the puzzle of when
and to whom the rights and obligations should flow. The existing
implied contract and implied status approaches have not been
wholly unsuccessful at providing rights to nonmarital partners,
but they work infrequently and incoherently. That is because they
have either dismissed consent or have misinterpreted it, favoring
nonviable rationales such as dependency creation or similarity to
marriage.
This Article seeks to reclaim consent as the basis to regulate
informal intimate relationships. As a conclusion about the nexus
between will, conduct, and consequence, consent is an analytic
tool well suited to interrogating when intimate relationships
should trigger legal consequences. This Article proposes two
doctrinal improvements to establish whether nonmarital partners
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have consented to regulation. First, it outlines an objective
approach to determine whether parties’ conduct justifies the
imposition of relevant legal obligations. Second, it argues that the
inquiry should often focus on discrete commitments—whether
property
sharing,
ongoing
financial
support,
or
companionship—rather than all of the bundled rights and
obligations of marriage. Nonmarital partners may often consent
to some, but not all, of these obligations. This improved consent
framework suggests reforms to existing doctrines and also
grounds functional approaches that respond to nonmarital
partners’ needs and lived experiences.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider when, if ever, the following relationships should trigger
legal obligations, either between the partners themselves, or between
the partners and the state:
Anna and Ben: Anna and Ben move into a rented apartment
after they graduate from college. They dated during their senior year
and are known to be a couple. They split the rent and expenses, like
groceries, but they maintain separate bank accounts. They separately
purchase big-ticket items, like furniture and electronics, but try to
even out the expenses. After a few years, Anna decides to go to law
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school. Although she takes out student loans in her name, Ben covers
her share of the rent. They never explicitly exchange promises, but
Anna subjectively believes that she will do the same if she is ever able
to help Ben. After law school, Anna makes a much higher salary, but
Ben has been doing quite well at work himself. Both make over
$100,000, and they file income taxes as singles, thereby paying several
thousand dollars less than they would if married. By now, Anna and
Ben have lived together for nearly a decade.
Camille and David: Camille and David start dating on-and-off in
high school. Camille gets a job at a big-box retail store and, after two
years, becomes a manager. Camille eventually becomes pregnant with
David’s child, even though he is seeing several different women at the
time. Camille is excited to be pregnant; she wants someone to take
care of. After he hears the news, David decides to move in with
Camille to help raise the child and to provide a more traditional
family environment. Camille continues to pay the rent on her onebedroom apartment. Her salary, while consistent, is only enough to
cover the living expenses from month to month. David helps out
when he can but does not have a steady job. He likes to purchase gifts
for the child, like toys or a new pair of shoes, but doesn’t contribute
much to the child’s daily expenses. Camille doesn’t mind having
David around, and she loves him, but she knows that he has cheated
on her in the past, and she is also wary of his ability to hold down a
job.
Eunice and Fanny: Eunice and Fanny met when Fanny moved
into the same retirement community a few years ago. Eunice was
recently widowed. She has two adult children who live out of state.
She owns her house, which she purchased with proceeds from the sale
of her marital residence. She has several hundred thousand dollars in
assets. Fanny also has two adult children. She divorced her husband
about a decade ago. She also owns her house and has several hundred
thousand dollars in savings. Eunice and Fanny began spending time
together because they had so much in common. Eventually, they
realized that they were sexually, as well as emotionally, attracted to
each other. They spend several nights a week together, alternating
between their houses. They also spend virtually every day together,
watching television, going for walks, or taking vacations. They
consider this relationship to be the most intimate they have
experienced, but they do not want to marry because of concerns
about the impact of marriage on their Social Security benefits and on
their estates.
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* * *
These examples illustrate a growing social trend. Despite its
continuing centrality to the legal regulation of the family, marriage
has nearly lost its position as the predominant family form in the
United States. In 1967, 70.3% of the adult population lived in married
households.1 Fifty years later, that share has dropped to 51.5%.2 One
in five adults over the age of twenty-five, 42 million of them, have
never married, and one in four adults currently aged twenty-five to
thirty-four may never do so.3 Unmarried cohabitants—over 18 million
of them—now make up 7.1% of the adult population.4 An even
greater share of the adult population report’s being in committed
intimate relationships while living in separate residences, giving rise
to the label “Living Apart Together” (“LATs”).5
The law currently has little to say about these tens of millions of
nonmarital relationships. All three of the relationships just described
might dissolve without ever attracting the state’s attention. This
brings some benefits: Anna qualifies for federal loans for which she
might have been ineligible if Ben’s income was factored in,6 and they
both save several thousand dollars a year in income tax payments.7
Camille avoids liability for David’s financial obligations. Additionally,
David’s income will not factor into her eligibility for federal benefits

1. See Table AD-3: Living Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo
/families/adults.html [https://perma.cc/Y6BN-QV2A] (follow “Table AD-3. Living
Arrangements of Adults 18 and Over, 1967 to Present” hyperlink). Other options besides
living with a spouse include living alone, living with one’s parents, living with an intimate
partner, living with other relatives, or living with nonrelatives (i.e., roommates). See id.
2. See id.
3. WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF
AMERICANS HAVE NEVER MARRIED 4, 12 (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2014/09/2014-09-24_Never-Married-Americans.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2G5H-CL87].
4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1.
5. See Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 289, 310–11 (2011); see also Jacquelyn J. Benson & Marilyn Coleman, Older
Adults Developing a Preference for Living Apart Together, 78 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 797,
797 (2016).
6. See Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1294–96 (2014);
see also Basic Eligibility Criteria, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa
/eligibility/basic-criteria [https://perma.cc/38LS-V43W] (noting that “financial need” is a
general eligibility requirement for federal student aid).
7. See Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for
Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 616–17 (explaining that
couples who earn similar or equal incomes experience little to no benefit from filing joint
taxes).
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like the Earned Income Tax Credit.8 Eunice avoids losing Social
Security widow benefits,9 and she and Fanny both avoid having to
redo their estate plans to make sure that their property passes to their
children. And they all avoid the potential expense of a judicially
supervised divorce. But the couples also miss out on valuable rights
currently given to married couples, including rights as against the
state, third parties, and the spouses themselves. In all three situations,
the less-well-off partner would struggle to establish his or her
entitlement to shared property or support. If Ben is killed in an
accident, Anna cannot sue for wrongful death and will not inherit
Ben’s estate without a will. David likely cannot get health insurance
from Camille’s employer. And Eunice or Fanny may be denied
visitation or medical decision-making authority if one of them ends
up hospitalized. Moreover, to the extent that the state would like to
use intimate relationships as a regulatory tool—to enforce morality,
privatize dependency, and administer laws, among other
objectives10—the lack of regulation amounts to a missed opportunity.
Most states offer pathways for nonmarital couples to formalize
their relationships. A handful of states and municipalities have
created statuses like civil unions and domestic partnerships that
provide a defined set of legal rights and obligations for couples who
formally register.11 Additionally, in the forty years following the
Supreme Court of California’s pathbreaking Marvin v. Marvin12
decision, nearly all states allow nonmarital partners to enter binding
agreements regarding their respective property rights.13 The use of

8. See, e.g., Do I Qualify for EITC?, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions
/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/do-i-qualify-for-earned-income-tax-credit-eitc
[https://perma.cc/7NQR-ZFM9].
9. See Michael J. Brien, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & David A. Weaver, Widows Waiting
to Wed? (Re)Marriage and Economic Incentives in Social Security Widow Benefits 2 (Soc.
Sec. Admin. Office of Research, Evaluation, & Statistics, Paper No. 89, 2001),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp89.html [https://perma.cc/C98C-77QA].
10. See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
1999, 2035–41 (2017).
11. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship
Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 375, 382–85 (2015) (describing statuses, like Colorado
designated beneficiaries and Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries, that can extend to two adults
who may be in a presumptively non-sexual relationship, like a parent and child); Douglas
NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 114–54 (2014) (describing the historical
adoption of municipal and statewide domestic partner registries in California).
12. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
13. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 47–48 (2010) (noting that all but three states recognize some form of agreements
between cohabitants).
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formalities, like registering for a formal status or executing a written
agreement, identifies the partners’ preferences and minimizes the risk
of erroneous determinations. Partners seeking to enter a domestic
partnership in California, for example, must fill out, sign, notarize,
and file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership, in which they declare
that they meet statutory-eligibility requirements.14 A written
agreement memorializes the parties’ intentions and is often
accompanied by procedural safeguards,15 such as reliance on legal
counsel. Formalities provide evidence of the partners’ intentions,
caution them against inconsiderate action, and focus their attention
on the conduct likely to affect their legal rights.16
The problem is that most nonmarital partners do not engage
these formalities. Couples wishing to formalize their relationships
marry; they rarely elect to enter a formal nonmarital status. For
instance, during the first three months that civil unions were available
in Illinois, only 87 of 1,470 couples entering civil unions in Cook
County were marriage-eligible.17 In 2015, after same-sex marriage
became legal in Hawaii, only 23 couples entered civil unions
compared to the 22,820 who married.18 Since Colorado created a
designated beneficiary status in 2009 allowing two unmarried people
to agree to provide one another with legal rights, benefits, and
protections, only 672 couples in three populous counties registered as
designated beneficiaries in comparison to the approximately 131,100
who married.19 Written agreements between nonmarital partners also
appear to be rare.20
14. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg. Sess.
laws); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, DOMESTIC PARTNERS REGISTRY FORMS & FEES,
DECLARATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1, http://dp.cdn.sos.ca.gov/forms/sf-dp1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3V7E-U8SF] (setting forth eligibility requirements for domestic
partnership).
15. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941)
(noting that written agreements serve an evidentiary and cautionary function).
16. See id. at 800–03 (describing evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions
performed by formalities and explaining how they interrelate). As many scholars have
observed, formalities do not eliminate the risk of error, see, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Identity
and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 807–28 (2015) (discussing a formal identity model and
highlighting the inherent problems when the law depends on formalities); Matsumura,
supra note 10, at 2048–49, but they reduce the risk considerably.
17. See COOK COUNTY CLERK DAVID ORR, OPPOSITE-SEX CIVIL UNIONS:
MOTIVES FOR NOT MARRYING 1, https://www.cookcountyclerk.com/sites/default/files/pdfs
/Opposite%20Sex%20Civil%20Union%20Report%20Final%2012.19.11.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NB5H-WFDT].
HAW.,
DEP’T
HEALTH,
18. Preliminary
2015
Vital
Statistics,
ST.
http://health.hawaii.gov/vitalstatistics/preliminary-2015/ [https://perma.cc/Y8G4-RNDT].
19. Based on searches of the online public records systems of Colorado’s largest
counties. Denver County issued only 465 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009
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Most nonmarital relationships develop organically with questions
about legal ramifications arising after the partners have intertwined
their lives in various respects. Without formalities, the regulatory
challenges are daunting. Imperfectly calibrated entrance
requirements to relationship-based statuses will sweep too broadly,
dragging in people who had no intention of assuming legal
obligations, or too narrowly, thereby excluding people who stood to
benefit from those protections. Any serious effort to recognize
nonmarital relationships must therefore answer when, short of formal
registration, a relationship will trigger various legal rights and
obligations.21
to 2017, compared to 47,799 marriage licenses during the same period. Denver Clerk and
OF
THE
CLERK
&
RECORDER,
Recorder
Online
Services,
OFFICE
https://countyfusion3.kofiletech.us/countyweb/disclaimer.jsp. El Paso County issued only
62 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009 to 2017, compared to 49,296 marriage
and civil union licenses. Marriage/Civil Union Records Search, CLERK & RECORDER,
http://recordingsearch.car.elpasoco.com/rsui/MarriageRecords/Search.aspx.
Jefferson
County issued 145 Designated Beneficiary Agreements from 2009 to 2017, compared to
34,082 marriage licenses. Clerk and Recorder Web Access, JEFFERSON CTY., COLO.,
https://landrecords.co.jefferson.co.us/Marriage/SearchEntry.aspx. Aggregation of the
numbers performed by author using online search databases for Denver County, Jefferson
County, and El Paso County.
20. I am unaware of a systematic study of the prevalence of written agreements
between nonmarital partners. Anecdotally, legal disputes reported in case law rarely, if
ever, involve the validity of such agreements. See generally Albertina Antognini, The Law
of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing the relevant case law).
21. Several scholars have proposed models for regulating intimate relationships that
touch on this question, at least in passing. These proposals have (1) focused on the
conscription of couples in marriage-like relationships, see generally, BOWMAN, supra note
13 (imposing marital property obligations on long-term cohabitants); Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, if
Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 235–36
(2016) (proposing to treat long-term cohabitants as married for all purposes); see also
William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal
for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1716–18 (1984) (suggesting that
legislation recognizing a new status for cohabitants could clarify their rights and
obligations); (2) advocated for the expansion of status-alternatives to marriage, see
Culhane, supra note 11, at 376 (examining “the establishment and subsequent flowering of
several new forms of legally recognized relationships”); (3) argued for the expansion of
rights to people outside the traditional sexual dyad, see generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW
(2008) (proposing to offer legal benefits to relationships that perform the functions those
benefits seek to reward); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV.
189 (2007) (exploring how family law could recognize and protect purely platonic
relationships); (4) considered rules that would strengthen contractual rights, see generally
Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573 (2013) (proposing “registered
contractual relationships” as a legal-status alternative to marriage in which couples sign a
contract defining their rights and obligations to each other); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura,
Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 159 (2013) (criticizing
courts’ use of the public policy doctrine to avoid enforcement of intimate agreements); see
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There is a developing consensus that the law should recognize
informal relationships, at least for some purposes. Jurisdictions have
taken two approaches. First is an implied contract approach—many
of the states that follow Marvin allow partners to attempt to establish
the existence of unwritten agreements, although these attempts are
often “uncertain and costly.”22 Second is an informal status
approach—a small number of courts have recognized that certain
relationships will give rise to enforceable duties based on the nature
of the relationship rather than the exchange of express or implied
promises.23 This is also the approach advocated in the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (“ALI
Principles”), under which the sharing of a common residence for a
predetermined period of time would give rise to a presumption that
the couple are domestic partners.24
The existing approaches rarely produce satisfactory outcomes.
Courts seldom recognize implied contracts because they hold litigants
to stringent standards, expecting either that every contingency be
expressly bargained for or that the parties have made “marriage-like
commitments.”25 In doing so, the implied contract approach departs

also June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 108–10, 112 (2016)
(asserting that the law “should respect independent actors who manage their own
relationship terms”); or (5) advocated more generally for the recognition of a space
outside of marriage, see, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to
Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 481–87 (2017) (outlining a constitutional right to
nonmarriage); Melissa Murray, Accommodating Nonmarriage, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 661,
664–66 (2015) (calling for greater accommodation of nonmarital relationships as a
meaningful alternative to marriage).
22. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 255–56.
23. See infra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
24. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
25. Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 885 (2005) [hereinafter, Garrison, Is
Consent Necessary?]; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal
Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1447 (2001)
(“[I]n order to bring a claim successfully, a partner must establish that the cohabitation
was the substantive equivalent of marriage.”); Scott, supra note 22, at 258 (emphasizing
the importance of facts indicating the relationship is “marriage-like”). Some states, like
New York, flat-out refuse to enforce implied agreements, see, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413
N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) (“[W]e decline to recognize an action based upon an
implied contract for personal services between unmarried persons living together.”); see
also Scott, supra note 22, at 256 n.99 (citing Morone and other cases from different states
that reject enforcement of implied agreements), while others just make such agreements
difficult to prove, see Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and
Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 317 (2008) (noting that California appellate decisions
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from mainstream contract doctrine, which takes a more permissive
view of contract enforcement.26
Informal status approaches like the ALI Principles assign rights
based on the relationship’s conformity to an amalgam of social,
cultural, or legal standards that approximate marriage.27 This
approach struggles to draw lines between those relationships that
deserve regulation and those that do not. As the opening
hypotheticals illustrate, nonmarital relationships are diverse. Within
these relationships, partners may experience subjective feelings like
attraction, love, and commitment, and they may engage in objective
acts like caregiving, division of domestic labor, pooling of funds, and
sexual intercourse. But the relationships need not involve all these
things; neither, for that matter, does marriage, making the task of
comparing the relationships particularly daunting.
By drawing comparisons to marriage, both approaches tend to
enshrine a traditional, middle-class ideal of intimate relationships
typified by the breadwinner/homemaker model, ignoring changing
norms as well as class and cultural differences.28 Moreover, both
approaches only recognize inter se rights—obligations running
between the partners. They leave off the table whether and how the
law should recognize rights against the state or third parties, like
standing to sue for wrongful death or favorable tax treatment.29
These shortcomings stem in large part from misunderstandings
or mistrust of consent. Consent is not a totemic concept that one must
either accept or reject wholesale, but rather a conclusion about the
nexus between subjective will, conduct, and consequence.30 Consent is
also context-dependent. The imposition of general legal obligations
on the citizenry requires a different type of consent, if any, than
sexual contact or the performance of a medical procedure by a

demonstrate “that the Marvin requirements have been strictly construed and that an
award is by no means easy to obtain”).
26. See Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage, in 24
RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS: A JOURNAL OF POLICY 161, 162 (Dana L. Gold ed.,
2009) (“Both supporters and opponents of a ‘contractual’ approach to marriage law tend
to use ‘contract’ to signify a market-libertarian normative view about the role of
bargaining rather than to refer to the actual, more complex nature of contract law.”).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 165–67.
28. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
29. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (1981).
30. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 55,
57 (Frank Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (defining consent as “both a decision in
favor of a proposed course of action and an authorization”—“a permission-giving act”).
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physician.31 Consent’s role in the regulation of intimate relationships
has received minimal attention.32 The requirement of consent has
been parroted or brushed aside but not interrogated.
In this Article, I explore, and ultimately defend, the role of
consent in regulating informal relationships. I propose two
methodological refinements for analyzing whether partners have
consented to legal regulation based on their informal relationships.
The first focuses on how to determine whether a party’s conduct
justifies the state’s exercise of authority. The second focuses on how
to define the object of consent.
To answer the first question—when a person’s conduct justifies
legal regulation—I draw lessons from the analysis of consent in
contract doctrine. Courts and scholars have long struggled to
reconcile the doctrinal ideal of consent33—“the master concept that
defines the law of contracts in the United States”34—with the reality
that parties will not contemplate or agree to all of the terms in their
agreement35 and will inevitably be governed by background rules that
they did not elect.36 The enforcement of every contract raises the
question whether it is just, based on the commitments a party willed,
to hold that party to commitments she did not expressly intend to
make. Courts have developed doctrines to ensure that the agreements

31. See infra Section II.A.
32. The related concepts of autonomy and choice have received significant attention.
For example, hundreds of articles have been written about the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of autonomous choice in the family realm to
marry a same-sex spouse, to create or terminate a parent-child relationship, or to create
other types of family relationships. Consent, on the other hand, is rarely discussed. Even
articles that explicitly reference consent in their titles, see generally, Garrison, Is Consent
Necessary?, supra note 25, do not spend much time defining the concept and tend to fall
back on the concept of autonomy.
33. See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach,
1988 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 141–42 (describing consent as a central pillar of
neoclassical contract theory that “is increasingly being seen as only one of a number of
factors affecting contract-like liability”).
34. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994).
35. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627,
628 (2002); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989) (describing background rules over which
people do not typically bargain).
36. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 730 (1990); Craswell, supra note 35, at 490;
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World:
What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 323, 335–36.
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reflect the parties’ broader goals37: they ensure a minimum level of
mental competence and voluntariness to protect the parties’ will but
then look to objective acts to establish assent to the key aspects of the
transaction. Without certainty as to the central terms of the
transaction, the law will not intervene. But once those key terms are
sufficiently certain, the law will supply a range of background rules
and missing terms even if the parties did not will or contemplate those
terms.38 These rules enable courts to operationalize gradations of
consent.39
This textured approach to the concept of justification is the first
step. The second is the identification of the relevant legal obligation.
To answer the question “consent to what?”, we must disaggregate the
legal obligations associated with marriage. Rarely will an informal
relationship justify the imposition of all of marriage’s rights and
obligations.40 To reflect the characteristics of varied relationships,
packages of rights must be tailored according to the different
functions the relationships serve for the partners and the state.
Couples who provide each other with emotional support or request
leave from employers to take care of each other but keep their
finances separate, for example, might consent to provide caregiving41
37. The requirement of definiteness, for example, relieves parties of liability when
they have not agreed to key terms. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent:
Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (2004)
(“[A] communication is an offer—such that it can be accepted unilaterally—only if it is
definite.”). The rule against enforcing agreements to agree is a variation on this
requirement. Id. at 1829–30 (explaining that no liability arises between the parties while
the agreement is being negotiated). One area in which these rules have arguably failed to
protect parties is in dealing with contracts of adhesion. See Margaret Jane Radin, The
Deformation of Contract in the Information Society, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 517–
23 (2017) (discussing multiple approaches developed by courts to interpret “boilerplate”
contracts of adhesion); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing
Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 127, 132 (2017).
38. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 35, at 503–05 (noting that parties cannot possibly
contemplate all of the rules governing their relationship, like rules governing “excuses,
remedies, and other details of the promisor’s obligation,” and must therefore rely on
background rules provided by the legal system).
39. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 37, at 1831 (suggesting that consent can be
conceptualized as a consensus between parties that grows as negotiations continue). To be
clear, although many of these doctrines are well settled, the role of consent in contract law
writ large is not. See infra Section III.A.
40. See infra Section I.A.2 (discussing the ways in which cohabitation is similar and
dissimilar to marriage).
41. Spousal-support obligations are reflected and encouraged in statutes like the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2016) (entitling employees to take
reasonable leave to help care for a newborn or adopted child and to care for a child or
spouse who has a serious health condition), and its state counterparts, as well as in
common law doctrines that impose upon spouses a duty of support, see, e.g., Borelli v.
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or to make end-of-life decisions, but not to divide property equally
when the relationship comes to an end. Disaggregation calls attention
to the things that matter—the functions themselves—rather than the
relational proxy of marriage.
Thinking of regulation within this framework of consent provides
immediate and long-term payoffs. It suggests concrete reforms to the
implied contract doctrine: courts looking for implied agreements too
often analyze the parties’ conduct in the shadow of marriage and must
instead consider whether the conduct justifies discrete obligations. It
also suggests that informal status approaches should not analogize to
marriage and impose rights and obligations in an all-or-nothing
fashion. These approaches would be more effective if they focused on
disaggregated commitments revolving around core functions like
property sharing, childrearing, or emotional support.
Looking toward the future, consent provides a heretofore
missing foundation for proposals to regulate intimate relationships
based on the functions they perform. Scholars calling for a functional
approach—that like relationships should be treated alike—have
struggled to explain when regulation should begin.42 Assuming the
state wants to provide legal protections or impose responsibilities on
those in informal relationships,43 it must decide when to do so without

Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (citing numerous California
cases that impose a duty of spousal support).
42. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 224 (“After they have been living together
for two years or have a child, a cohabiting couple should be treated by the law as though
they were married.”); Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1143, 1148, 1156, 1159 (relying on
cohabitation for different lengths of time depending on the government benefit);
Waggoner, supra note 21, at 239–40 (treating a couple as married if they share a common
household and are in a committed relationship). Nancy Polikoff has proposed entry
requirements so capacious that they would almost certainly be rejected. See POLIKOFF,
supra note 21, at 195. For example, she argues that “all those dependent in whole or part
upon the deceased” should be able to sue for wrongful death. Id.
43. The purpose of this Article is to engage the courts and scholars that have
attempted to recognize informal nonmarital relationships through contract or status
approaches and to demonstrate why those approaches have gone astray. The analysis
sheds light on the ways in which nonmarried partners live and how legal regulation could
impact them. It therefore informs—but admittedly does not answer—the ultimate
question whether the state should regulate people in informal relationships. The stakes of
that question are high, as Professor Harry Krause presciently observed at the turn of the
millennium:
Socio-philosophers might ask themselves whether giving legal status to cohabitants
is “progressive”—as the mostly liberal advocates insist it is—or whether it is in
reality “reactionary”—as conservatives would generally deny? Instead of
accepting and adapting to “modern lifestyles,” does the legalized cohabitation
movement discourage out-of-wedlock cohabitation by making “free love” unfree?
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the benefit of formal registration. Neglecting consent, proponents of
functional approaches have struggled to answer this question.
Approaching regulation through the lens of consent would encourage
courts and legislators to articulate the relationship between the
parties’ conduct and the imposition of legal obligations. Moreover,
the narrower scope of obligation would result in a reduced cost of
adjudicatory error. The eventual accretion of legal and social norms
based on the salient characteristics of lived relationships could also
aid both nonmarital partners and the state in making sense of
informal relationships.44 Although the articulation of a functional
regulatory system is beyond the scope of this Article, reckoning with
consent is a necessary first step toward a more responsive, functional
family law.
I. NONMARITAL RELATIONSHIPS AND LEGAL REGULATION
This Part provides a descriptive account of nonmarital
relationships. It considers both the subjective attitudes of people in
nonmarital relationships and the way they structure their
relationships. It then uses this descriptive account to contextualize the
existing efforts to regulate informal relationships and to explain why
those efforts have struggled.
A. Understanding Nonmarital Relationships
Tens of millions of adults in the United States have nonmarital
partners.45 Their relationships vary in myriad ways, including attitudes
At worst, does it resurrect the time-honored legal institution of “concubinage,”
conferring on the “concubine” a legal status somewhere below that of a spouse?
Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex—Or Not at
All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 297–98 (2000).
44. For a discussion of norm deficits, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From
Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 293, 360–62 (2015); Chiung-Ya Tang, Melissa Curran & Analisa Arroyo,
Cohabitors’ Reasons for Living Together, Satisfaction with Sacrifices, and Relationship
Quality, 50 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 598, 600 (2014).
45. For the purposes of this descriptive analysis, I use the term “partner” to refer
broadly to people in nonmarital relationships. This term encompasses people who live
together in intimate relationships and people in intimate relationships who live in separate
households. However, much of the available data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, in
particular, the Current Population Survey, which focuses on people who self-identify as
sharing a residence with a nonmarital partner, and the National Survey of Family Growth,
which asks about cohabitation. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 1; NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL SURVEY FOR FAMILY GROWTH 6, https://www.cdc.gov
/nchs/data/nsfg/nsfg_2013-15_malea_crq.pdf [http://perma.cc/87K6-LP2K]. When referring
to these studies, I use the terms “cohabitation” and “cohabitants.” Although consent could
theoretically ground the regulation of relationships involving people who intertwine their
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toward cohabitation and marriage—for example, whether they view
the relationship as permanent or temporary, exclusive or
nonexclusive, a stepping stone to marriage or not—and the structure
of the relationships—for example, whether they are raising children,
whether they have been previously married or have children from
previous marriages, whether one or both partners are in the
workforce, the extent to which they have commingled their property
or finances, and whether they have sexual relations. This Section
reveals the tenuous relationship between subjective views and
objective conduct.
1. Subjective Views
Nonmarital partners hold differing views about the significance
of their relationships. Social science research has focused on three
dimensions—permanency, intimacy, and commitment—when
assessing the strength of nonmarital relationships.
Permanency. One important point of difference is whether
partners see cohabitation as being permanent or temporary. Partners
make predictions about whether their relationships will likely
endure.46 These feelings may be reflected in their confidence about
whether they will eventually marry47 or their ambivalence about
wanting a future with their current partner.48

lives in various ways but whose relationships are not defined by physical intimacy, like
siblings, those relationships have not been studied in the same way and are therefore
omitted from this descriptive account.
46. See Michael Pollard & Kathleen Mullan Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage
Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy, and Commitment, 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (RAND Labor &
Population, Working Paper No. WR-1001, 2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/working_papers/WR1000/WR1001/RAND_WR1001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24HEBGLU] (comparing the average permanency of three different types of relationships—(1)
couples who cohabitate, (2) married couples who cohabitated prior to marriage, and (3)
married couples who did not cohabitate before marriage).
47. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES 78 (2010), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/11/pewsocial-trends-2010-families.pdf [https://perma.cc/84DJ-NEVR] (“As for the marital
intentions of people who currently are cohabitating, 69% say they expect they will
someday marry that person, 25% say they don’t expect to and 6% don’t know or would
not answer.”). A 2013 National Center for Health Statistics study reported that 40% of
first cohabitation transitioned to marriage within three years, 32% remained in a
cohabiting relationship at the three-year mark, and 27% had dissolved. Casey E. Copen,
Kimberly Daniels & William D. Mosher, First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States:
2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Washington, D.C.) Apr. 2013 at 1.
48. Scott M. Stanley, Sarah W. Whitton & Howard J. Markman, Maybe I Do:
Interpersonal Commitment and Premarital or Nonmarital Cohabitation, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES
496, 512 (2004).
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Intimacy. Intimacy refers to levels of “reported closeness, love,
and satisfaction.”49 Studies of intimacy ask respondents to rate the
“closeness” of their relationship or ask how much the respondents
love their partner.50 They also analyze the partners’ motives for being
with each other. For example, one intimacy study assessed whether
the couples chose to live together for reasons related to spending
more time together, reasons related to convenience, or reasons
related to testing the relationship.51 In another study, respondents
were asked to consider whether their family now is closer, less close,
or the same level of closeness as their families were when they were
growing up.52
Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent studies have found that the
motives for cohabiting can affect commitment and relationship
quality. People who cohabit to spend time together also reveal higher
levels of commitment and relationship satisfaction, and lower
reported levels of ambivalence and conflict.53
Commitment. Commitment is an amorphous concept that
straddles the line between permanency and intimacy. It can measure
the extent to which people perceive the relationship to be enduring,54
as well as levels of emotional attachment to one’s partner.55
Commitment may stem from a desire to be in the relationship and to
maintain it in the future, what theorists call “dedication,” or from
forces that make it difficult to leave the relationship regardless of
one’s desires, such as structural or financial investments or social
pressures, what theorists call “constraints.”56 Although not all
constraints are subjectively perceived as constraining, financial and

49. Pollard & Harris, supra note 46, at 13.
50. Id. at 17–18, tbls.1–2 (Panel B). For a comparison of intimacy indicators between
cohabitating respondents and married respondents, see id. at 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (illustrating
that the rates for cohabitation are slightly lower than the rates for marriages of the same
length).
51. Galena K. Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley & Howard J. Markman, Couples’ Reasons
for Cohabitation: Associations with Individual Well-Being and Relationship Quality, 30 J.
FAM. ISSUES 233, 246–47, 251 (2009).
52. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 47, at 49.
53. See Tang et al., supra note 44, at 615.
54. See, e.g., Pollard & Harris, supra note 46, at 17 tbl.1, 18 tbl.2 (grouping partners’
perceptions about the permanency of the relationship under the “commitment” category).
55. See Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 503–04 (calculating interpersonal commitment
from four subscales related to emotional attachment, including the degree to which a
person considered the relationship to be the most important thing in his life).
56. Galena K. Rhoades, Scott M. Stanley & Howard J. Markman, A Longitudinal
Investigation of Commitment Dynamics in Cohabiting Relationships, 33 J. FAM. ISSUES
369, 371 (2012).
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structural investments, such as splitting the rent, are not highly
correlated with dedication.57
Commitment theorists have observed that individuals in close
relationships move “from acting based on self-interest to acting based
on preferences for joint outcomes.”58 This transformation involves the
development of “we-ness,” where “one’s partner’s satisfactions and
dissatisfactions become more and more identified with one’s own.”59
The level of dedication affects the extent to which one partner will
place the interests of the other partner or the relationship over his or
her immediate self-interests, and the way the partner will perceive the
sacrifice as satisfying or harmful.60 Scientists have identified different
measures of dedication, including the importance of the relationship
relative to anything else in life; whether the respondent would want to
be with his partner in a few years; whether the respondent thought of
his partner in terms of “us” and “we” rather than “me” and “her”;
and whether he wanted the relationship to stay strong regardless of
“rough times.”61
* * *
As I will demonstrate in Section I.B, existing regulatory
approaches to informal relationships value these subjective views.
They assume that legal intervention is unnecessary when the partners
are just trying out their relationship but seek to reward dedication
and other indicators of permanency, intimacy, and commitment. That
the law should reward these subjective views begs the question of how
to identify when one or both partners hold them.

57. Id.; see also id. at 375–76 (reporting that dedication scores and a checklist of
twenty-five external factors revealing constraint were “not significantly correlated”); id. at
384 (noting that constraints made it harder to break up regardless of the intrinsic desire to
be together). This finding suggests that behavior often taken as a signal of subjective
dedication may not always indicate a person’s subjective feelings about the relationship.
58. Scott M. Stanley, Galena K. Rhoades & Sarah W. Whitton, Commitment:
Functions, Formation, and the Securing of Romantic Attachment, 2 J. FAM. THEORY &
REV. 243, 244 (2010).
59. Id. (quoting George Levinger, A Social Exchange View on the Dissolution of Pair
Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE IN DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS 175 (Robert L.
Burgess & Ted L. Huston eds., 1979)).
60. Id. at 246.
61. Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 503. Participants were asked to rate their
agreement with the four dedication measures on a scale of one to five with one indicating
strong disagreement, three indicating neutrality, and five indicating strong agreement. Id.
at 503. The mean aggregated score for cohabitants was 15.74, suggesting an average
response of nearly four (“agree”). Id. at 506. The mean aggregated score for married
couples was 18.09. Id.
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2. Objective Realities
The law has treated objective acts as proxies for the partners’
subjective views. This Section identifies those proxies and challenges
the link between them and the views they supposedly represent.
Financial interdependence. Courts and scholars have treated the
pooling of finances as an important factor determining the duties
couples owe each other upon dissolution of their relationships.62
Commingling property can provide insights into the ways in which the
partners may have viewed their relationship.63 Pooling of finances, in
the form of joint accounts or shared property ownership, may suggest
a willingness to pursue collective interests instead of individual ones,
which could indicate the subjective belief that the relationship is
permanent or a greater commitment to a future together.64 It may also
indicate greater confidence in the quality or stability of the
relationship.65
Social scientists have found that approximately half of cohabiting
couples keep their finances separate. One study found that 45.7% of
cohabiting couples maintain separate finances.66 That study is
consistent with another study that concluded that 52% of cohabitants
shared income in a common pot.67 Although cohabitants who
maintain joint accounts may enjoy higher relationship quality than
62. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (identifying “[t]he extent to
which the parties intermingled their finances” and “[t]he extent to which their relationship
fostered the parties’ economic interdependence” as factors revealing a shared life);
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 61–69 (citing various cases in which the courts
examined the degree to which cohabitants commingled their funds).
63. I use conditional language here because commingling property does not
necessarily suggest commitment or intimacy. A couple may pool resources due to the
scarcity or expense of housing or other practical considerations. See Fiona RoseGreenland & Pamela J. Smock, Living Together Unmarried: What Do We Know About
Cohabiting Families?, in HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 255, 264 (Gary W.
Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 2013) (noting an interview study conducted in New York
which concluded that a majority of respondents cohabited due to finances, convenience, or
changes in their housing situation instead of a desire to try out marriage). And partners
who keep their finances separate might nonetheless consider themselves deeply
committed.
64. See Fenaba R. Addo & Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship
Quality in Low-Income Couples, 59 FAM. REL. 408, 410–11 (2010).
65. Id. at 411, 417 (suggesting this hypothesis but only finding support for it among
women but not men).
66. Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabitating and Married
Couples’ Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 525, 533 (2003).
67. Catherine Kenny, Cohabitating Couple, Filing Jointly? Resource Pooling and U.S.
Poverty Policies, 53 FAM. REL. 237, 243 (2004).
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those who do not,68 pooling does not always reflect “we-ness.” When
couples pool money, the ways in which they contribute can vary. A
couple may regard household money as “nebulous and not formally
monitored or accountable” or may think of contributions as separate,
either as “‘equal contributions’ or going ‘half and half.’”69 The former
system has been called “joint pooling” and indicates that the couple
operates as a single economic unit; the latter is called “partial
pooling” and is based on the idea that the partners operate
autonomously.70 Cohabitants are more likely than married couples to
fall within the latter system and to view pooled funds as “separate,
individual, calculable, and directly accountable.”71 When higher
earning partners subsidize the lower earner, both partners understand
the practice as a form of generosity and a departure from the ideal of
an equal contribution model.72
Economic dependency. Relatedly, scholars have focused on the
ways in which the couple’s labor-market participation contributes to
dependency. Although in a majority of marriages, both spouses
participate in the labor force, the male-breadwinner-femalehomemaker model and the economic dependency that it creates has
not entirely disappeared. One justification for the creation of inter se
obligations between nonmarital partners has been to remediate this
dependency.73 Scholars have speculated about the extent to which
cohabitation may be a more gender-egalitarian institution than
marriage, especially regarding partners’ labor participation and
dependency, or whether it follows the patterns of marriage.74
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that out of 8,075,000
unmarried opposite-sex couples in 2016, 5,331,000, or 66%, were both
in the labor force.75 In almost 19% of couples, only the male partner
68. See Addo & Sassler, supra note 64, at 419 (“Couples practicing independent
money management report lower levels of relationship satisfaction.”).
69. Carolyn Vogler, Cohabiting Couples: Rethinking Money in the Household at the
Beginning of the Twenty First Century, 53 SOC. REV. 1, 18 (2005).
70. Carolyn Vogler, Michaela Brockmann & Richard D. Wiggins, Managing Money in
New Heterosexual Forms of Intimate Relationships, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 552, 565 (2008).
71. Vogler, supra note 69, at 18.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828–29 (discussing
dependency-creation rationale in the context of marital obligations).
74. See generally Vogler, supra note 69 (examining how couples organize finances to
assess the different ways in which cohabitation can remediate and simultaneously
reproduce traditional gender inequalities).
75. See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV893A] (last modified Apr. 6, 2017) (follow “Table UC1. Opposite Sex Unmarried Couples
By Labor Force Status Of Both Partners: 2016” hyperlink).
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was in the labor force; in 7% of couples, only the female partner was
in the labor force.76 This compares to the 51% of married couple
family groups with both spouses in the labor force, 22% in which only
the husband was in the labor force, and the almost 8% in which only
the wife was in the labor force.77 These figures indicate higher levels
of joint participation in the labor force by cohabiting couples,
although the differences could be explained in part by the
significantly higher percentage of married couples with neither spouse
in the labor force.78 In terms of gender, husbands are more likely than
men in cohabiting relationships to be the sole worker, although the
difference is not particularly stark.
Raising children. Although a robust body of scholarship
addresses questions about the rights and duties running between
nonmarital partners and their children,79 less attention has been paid
to how the presence of a child changes the horizontal relationship
between adult partners. As of 2015, of the 8.4 million opposite-sex
cohabiting households, approximately 3.3 million, or just under forty
percent, have a child under the age of eighteen.80 Roughly half of the
children in cohabiting households are the biological children of the
couple as opposed to only one of the partners.81
The presence of children may lead to behaviors associated with
commitment, although that commitment may take the form of
dedication or constraint.82 A caregiver may be less likely to make
76. See id.
77. See America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV893A] (last modified Apr. 6, 2017) (follow “Table FG2 Married Couple Family Groups,
By Family Income, and Labor Force Status of Both Spouses: 2016” hyperlink).
78. The data are not broken down by age, but the higher percentages of married
couples out of the workforce likely reflect higher percentages of retired couples.
79. See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (discussing the ways in which the law
influences families, including through regulation, indirect regulation, and social norms);
Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21 (discussing the financial and custodial obligations
underlying the legal treatment of nonmarriage); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family
Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 173 (2015)
(proposing greater legal rights and responsibilities for unmarried coparents).
80. Heidi Glenn, No, You’re Not in a Common Law Marriage After 7 Years Together,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 4, 2016, 8:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/04/487825901/no
-you-re-not-in-a-common-law-marriage-after-7-years-of-dating
[http://perma.cc/A9TCK98H (dark archive)] (summarizing U.S. Census Bureau statistics).
81. See Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 262.
82. See Rhoades et al., supra note 56, at 371 (“Dedication and constraint commitment
are sometimes associated, as one may choose to become more constrained because he or
she feels dedicated and behaviors undertaken because of dedication may lead to increased
constraints in the future.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018)

1032

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

decisions in his or her own interests, for example, by forgoing better
professional opportunities.83 Scholars have noted that where one
party disproportionately provides the caregiving, the caregiver
experiences market penalties in the form of lost wages and lower
retirement benefits while the non-caregiver earns higher wages than
they otherwise would.84 The data suggest that couples with children
are more likely to have a partner withdraw from the labor force:
69.6% of partners without children are both in the labor force, in
comparison to 60% of partners with children.85 A higher percentage
of men in cohabiting relationships with children will be in the labor
force relative to those without children: 88.6% to 82.6%.86 In contrast,
a lower percentage of women in cohabiting relationships with
children will be in the labor force when compared to women without
children: 67.6% to 76.8%.87 Moreover, women with children are less
likely to earn high salaries than women without, and somewhat less
likely to out-earn their male partners.88
Partners with children are also somewhat more likely to
contribute to a shared household, which, as discussed above, can
indicate greater commitment.89 A U.K. study of the way cohabiting
couples allocate money concluded that “cohabiting parents were very
similar to married respondents . . . in being most likely to use [a]
system in which households operated more or less as single economic
units, . . . whereas respondents in childless cohabiting unions stood
83. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and
Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012) (noting the “common case”
where the “mother earns much less than the father, primarily because her role as primary
family caregiver compromised her investment in the workplace” and proposing greater
post-dissolution financial support of a coparent based on a shared-parenting
commitment).
84. See Merle H. Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or
Share, 59 VILL. L. REV. 135, 149–50 (2014).
85. America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/families/cps-2016.html [http://perma.cc/J5HV893A] (follow “Table UC3. Opposite Sex Unmarried Couples by Presence of Biological
Children under 18, and Age, Earnings, Education, and Race and Hispanic Origin of Both
Partners: 2016” hyperlink).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. For example, only 42,000 women with children earn over $100,000, in
comparison to 173,000 women without children. See id. Twenty-three percent of women
with children out-earn their male partners, as compared to 27.7% of women without
children. See id.
89. See, e.g., Vogler, supra note 69, at 17 (“Whereas single couples who have a
biological child together appear to handle money in broadly similar ways to married
parents nubile and post-marital couples appear to handle money rather differently from
married couples.” (citation omitted)).
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out as being far more likely to keep money partly or completely
separate.”90 The study found, for instance, that 52% of cohabiting
parents operated a “joint pooling” system, in which couples pool all
their money, usually in a joint bank account, and each takes money as
needed, in comparison to 59% of married parents and 39% of
cohabitants without children.91 Only 34% of cohabiting parents used
an individualized financial system, in which partners keep much of
their finances separate, in comparison to the 61% of cohabitants
without children.92
Cutting in the other direction, “shotgun cohabitations,”
cohabitations beginning after conception but before childbirth,93 are
on the rise. A recent study found that 18.1% of women who were
unmarried and non-cohabiting at conception were cohabiting at birth,
as compared to the 5.3% who married.94 The imminent arrival of a
child encourages hastily arranged unions, which in turn “may be
poorly-matched, of low quality, and at greatest risk of dissolution,”95
and seem more likely to match the description of “convenience
reasons” for cohabiting that lead to lower levels of commitment and
intimacy.96 Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas have shown
that women whose partners move in because of the birth of a child
often do not marry because they do not want to link their financial
fates to those of their partners, or because they do not trust that their
partner will be fully committed to the relationship.97
Previous relationships. Another feature of most cohabiting
relationships is that at least one partner has previously been
married.98 This may affect attitudes about commitment or the
permanency of their relationship and may also affect other structural
considerations. For example, cohabitation can be grounds for
termination of support obligations, which can affect the way partners
90. Vogler et al., supra note 70, at 567 tbl.11.
91. See id. at 565, 567 tbl.11.
92. See id. at 565–66, 567 tbl.11 (categorizing the partial pooling and independent
management systems as individualized systems).
93. Daniel T. Lichter, Sharon Sassler & Richard N. Turner, Cohabitation, PostConception Unions, and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, 47 SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 135 (2014);
see also Heather Rackin & Christina M. Gibson-Davis, The Role of Pre- and
Postconception Relationships for First-Time Parents, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 526, 527
(2012).
94. Lichter et al., supra note 93, at 140 tbl.3.
95. Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
96. See Rhoades et al., supra note 56, at 240 tbl.1.
97. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 111–14 (2005).
98. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 117.
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structure their living arrangements, engage in intimacy, and pool their
resources.99 The presence of children from previous relationships,
whether marital or nonmarital, may impact a partner’s willingness to
tie his or her financial well-being to someone with preexisting support
obligations. Children may also provide an incentive to draw clear
lines between partners’ separate property to pass it on to their
respective children.100 These considerations are especially likely to
arise for older cohabitants. Ninety percent of adults over the age of
fifty-one who cohabit—a little over one million individuals—were
previously married.101 Retirees and surviving spouses must also
navigate concerns about the effect of subsequent relationships on
pensions and other financial matters.102
Cohabitation. The vast majority of studies discussed in this
Section assume the importance of living together under the same
roof. This assumption is reflected in the law. Policy proposals
targeting nonmarital relationships, like the ALI Principles, tend to
focus on people who are cohabiting.103
Yet the focus on co-residential couples ignores LATs—“a
monogamous intimate partnership between unmarried individuals
who live in separate homes but identify themselves as a committed
couple.”104 Recent studies indicate that between six to twelve percent
of adults in the U.S. are in LAT relationships,105 potentially greater
than the percentage who report cohabiting.106 The research also
99. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1315–20 (examining the cohabitation-termination
doctrine); Antognini, supra note 20, at 21–30 (discussing how courts define and assess the
nonmarital relationship when terminating domestic support payments).
100. See, e.g., Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 798, 803.
101. See Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 262.
102. See id.
103. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002); see also § 6.03(1) cmt. c (calling the
sharing of a primary residence a “threshold requirement”).
104. Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 797; see also Susan Frelich Appleton,
Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1453, 1491 (2014)
(defining LATs and noting that LATs would be classified as “single” under conventional
studies).
105. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, How Should the Law Treat Couples Who Live Apart
Together?, 29 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. (Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 17-43)
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3048340 [https://perma.cc/HS6T-9RW6] (reporting 9% of respondents in a national
survey and 12% of respondents in a New York survey (percentages rounded to the next
highest or lowest whole number)); Charles Q. Strohm et al., “Living Apart Together”
Relationships in the United States, 21 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 177, 190 (2009) (reporting
figures of 7% of women and 6% of men in the United States that are in a LAT
relationship).
106. See Berenson, supra note 5, at 311 (citing Strohm et al., supra note 105, at 190).
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reveals a preference among some older adults for the LAT model. As
noted above, older adults are more likely to be previously partnered,
which can affect the way they structure their relationships.
Research on LATs indicates that people who do not live under
the same roof can enjoy high levels of commitment and emotional
support.107 Within this category, there is variation: one qualitative
study from the U.K. observed that despite high reported levels of
overall commitment, LATs could be divided into four categories:
those who lived apart (1) because of preference about living alone;
(2) based on constraints or circumstances; (3) because it was too early
in the relationship to live together; and (4) based on a desire for less
commitment.108 Unsurprisingly, individuals in the first two categories
reported the highest levels of commitment, reporting joint decision
making and the sharing of confidences, hobbies, interests, and
expenses.109 Studies of older LATs indicate that they desire intimacy,
including physical and emotional support, without the legal obligation
to provide financial support or caregiving.110 Many reported the
avoidance of structural commitments as a benefit of the arrangement:
they could “maintain or establish autonomy via the continuance of
roles[,] . . . traditions/rituals[,] . . . and hobbies that predated the
LAT relationship.”111 But respondents indicated that they felt fully
committed on an emotional level, although their feelings of
commitment did not translate to beliefs about the permanence of
their relationships.112
The existence of LATs confirms that living under the same roof
is yet another proxy for subjective attributes. Conversely, people may
cohabit without feelings of permanency, intimacy, or commitment.

107. See id. (reviewing studies); see also Bowman, supra note 105, at 28 (reporting that
a plurality of LATs would turn to their partner first—as compared to friends or family
members—if emotionally upset).
108. Julia Carter et al., Sex, Love and Security: Accounts of Distance and Commitment
in Living Apart Together Relationships, 50 SOC. 576, 584 (2015); see also Bowman, supra
note 105, at 25 tbl.10, 26 fig.1 (surveying reasons for living apart and identifying responses
across a similar spectrum).
109. See Carter et al., supra note 108, at 584–87.
110. See Benson & Coleman, supra note 5, at 802–03. The findings of the Benson and
Coleman experiment reflect findings of studies conducted in other industrialized nations.
See id. at 798 (collecting studies).
111. Id. at 802.
112. See id. at 808.
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Cohabiting relationships fizzle out, with intimacy ending while the
parties still live together.113
Sex and exclusivity. Sex is another important proxy for subjective
attitudes. Sexual activity is central to the law’s recognition of intimate
adult relationships.114 It is often a touchstone for whether the law will
recognize a nonmarital relationship, either for awarding rights115 or
terminating them.116 Commitment scholars have associated sexual
exclusivity with relationship commitment and intimacy.117 Exclusivity
can signal “greater motivation for, and investment in, pleasing the
partner in a variety of ways, including sexually.”118 Scholars interpret
its absence as an indication of lack of commitment.119 Sexual activity
is treated as a marker of a healthy relationship and is often included
in measures of relationship quality. The assumption appears to be
that sex accompanies love and closeness.
Studies generally reveal that married and cohabiting couples
report having sex equally frequently and with similar levels of sexual
satisfaction.120 Although married individuals engage in extramarital
sex,121 studies indicate that people in nonmarital relationships are less
likely than people in marriages to be sexually exclusive.122
It is worth noting that while sex and exclusivity may indicate
intimacy and commitment, they also occur within relationships that

113. See, e.g., Fleming v. Spencer, 110 Wash. App. 1017, 2002 WL 171249, at *1–2
(Wash. App. Feb. 4, 2002) (unpublished) (involving a couple who ended physical intimacy
two years before the parties ceased cohabiting).
114. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145–50 (1995).
115. See, e.g., Fleming, 2002 WL 171249, at *2–5 (finding that a meretricious
relationship ended when a couple ceased to be intimate even though they continued to live
together for several more years); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7)(h) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (making the
existence of “physical intimacy” relevant to whether partners “share a life together”).
116. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 24–25 (noting the importance of sex to the
determination of whether to terminate alimony).
117. Carter et al., supra note 108, at 578.
118. Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 513.
119. See Heather D. Hill, Steppin’ Out: Infidelity and Sexual Jealousy Among
Unmarried Parents, in UNMARRIED COUPLES WITH CHILDREN 104, 108 (Paula England
& Kathryn Edin eds., 2007).
120. See Stanley et al., supra note 48, at 506 tbl.1 (showing spouses averaging 4.41 on a
Likert-type scale for sexual satisfaction in comparison to 4.13 for cohabitations); id. at 507
(“For analysis of sexual frequency, there was no significant effect for relationship status.”).
121. See Adaora A. Adimora, Victor J. Schoenbach & Irene A. Doherty, Concurrent
Sexual Partnerships Among Men in the United States, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2230, 2230
(2007) (finding that more than one in ten men is involved in concurrent relationships).
122. Id. at 2336; see also Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 841 n.100
(collecting sources).
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neither the partners nor outside observers would characterize as
serious. Moreover, many of the other structural attributes of
nonmarital relationships do not depend on sex: people can still pool
income and property, make professional sacrifices, and name each
other as beneficiaries of life insurance policies without having a
sexual relationship. Most subjective attitudes, like commitment,
permanency, and emotional closeness likewise can arise in non-sexual
relationships.123
* * *
The structural attributes discussed in this Section illustrate why
social scientists have characterized nonmarital relationships as
essentially heterogeneous124 and lacking in institutional norms.125
About half of cohabiting partners pool their finances while half do
not. Most pursue opportunities in the labor market, but some live in
single-earner households. Many have been in previous relationships,
but those that have may be old or young and may have dependent
children, adult children, or no children. The category of cohabitation
itself is over- and under-inclusive, leaving out people whose
relationships bear many other hallmarks of closeness because they do
not live under the same roof while including relationships that no
longer perform many of the desired functions. Additionally, these
objective indicia do not always correspond to the subjective views
they are supposed to represent. The pooling of income, for example,
may not reflect commitment when the partners mentally segregate
their contributions. Partners who choose not to live together may still
have strong feelings of intimacy or commitment.
3. Demographic Variations
The variations just discussed cut across demographic groups.
However, they tend to coalesce in distinct patterns around class and

123. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy,
59 EMORY L.J. 809, 850–54 (2010) (noting the potential benefits of separating sex from
intimacy); cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REV. 303, 350–53
(2014) (looking at and critiquing laws—like marriage’s consummation requirement—that
require sex).
124. See, e.g., Rose-Greenland & Smock, supra note 63, at 256 (“Along with the
increased focus on diversity in cohabitors has come recognition that there is diversity in
forms of cohabitation, or the cohabiting family itself.” (citations omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: Should
Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 LA. L. REV. 403, 407–08 (2004).
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race.126 Wealthier, better educated adults tend to marry each other
and have children within the marriage.127 Studies have found that
higher male earnings have a positive effect on marriage, the transition
between cohabitation and marriage, and childbirth within marriage.128
Higher education levels for women also have a positive effect on
marriage rates.129
In contrast, less wealthy and less educated adults are more likely
to be in comparatively unstable relationships. One study found that
“[i]n 2010, 58 percent of first births to women with either a high
school degree or some college were out of wedlock, while for those
with a college degree, the comparable statistic was only 12 percent.”130
The relationships of unmarried parents are much less likely to
survive. Data from The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study131
demonstrate that by the time their children were five years old, only
one-third of unmarried couples were still together, in comparison to
eighty percent of their married counterparts.132 Moreover, a
significant percentage of these parents go on to have children with
different men and women, resulting in what sociologists call
“multiparent fertility.”133
Sociologists like Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas have shown
that people in unstable relationships do not reject marriage. Rather,
they idealize marriage as something they want to do when they are
ready—something they want to do right.134 Edin and Kefalas point out
that given the prevalence of problems such as “domestic abuse,
chronic infidelity, alcoholism or drug addiction, repeated

126. See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 1–26; ISABEL V. SAWHILL, GENERATION
UNBOUND: DRIFTING INTO SEX AND PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE 65–70 (2014)
(examining the impacts of social class on decisions regarding marriage and childbearing).
127. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE 27 (2011); SAWHILL,
supra note 126, at 79.
128. See Marcia Carlson, Sara McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in
Fragile Families, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 239 (2004) (summarizing studies).
129. See id. at 250, 255 (summarizing findings from the Fragile Families study data).
130. See SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 70.
131. For information about this longitudinal study of “nearly 5,000 children born in
large U.S. cities between 1998 and 2000,” see About the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study, THE FRAGILE FAMILIES & CHILD WELLBEING STUDY,
https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/about [https://perma.cc/TLP3-3HFV].
132. SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 70–71.
133. See id.
134. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 106–09; see also BANKS, supra note 127, at
25–26.
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incarceration, or a living made from crime” in the low-income
population, their reluctance to marry “might be quite reasonable.”135
African Americans have felt the marriage decline particularly
acutely. Black women are half as likely to marry as white women, and
black spouses are nearly twice as likely as white spouses to divorce.136
These differences cannot be explained by class alone, as disparities
persist even into the middle and upper-middle classes.137 Ralph
Richard Banks identifies a complicated alchemy of factors that have
contributed to the decline of marriage among the black middle class,
including a shortage of eligible men,138 a refusal on the part of women
to “settle” for lower earning men,139 and the complicated dynamics of
interracial relationships.140
Whatever the causes, these findings identify a further challenge
for regulatory policy: the potential for disparate impacts across class
and race. As marriage stratifies, rules targeting informal relationships
are increasingly likely to impact people with lower education and less
wealth, or who come from certain racial groups. Put another way,
rules designed to enforce joint financial obligations or to redistribute
property between higher- and lower-income individuals141 fit less
comfortably in a world where the wealthy and well educated are
likely to marry each other and in which nonmarital couples may have
few assets and more liabilities.142
B.

Regulatory Attempts

The great variation in relationships described in this Part makes
it difficult to identify when legal rights and obligations should begin.
Attempts to regulate nonmarital relationships must explain whether
the partners’ subjective views are ever relevant to the imposition of
obligations, and, if so, which ones. Regardless of the law’s position
about subjective views, it must also identify the objective conduct that

135. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 97, at 216, 217.
136. BANKS, supra note 127, at 7–8.
137. See id. at 9.
138. See id. at 29–48.
139. See id. at 83–102.
140. See id. passim.
141. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122–23 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)
(recognizing express and implied agreements between cohabitants, in this case a
homemaker and a movie star).
142. See SAWHILL, supra note 126, at 75–76 (noting that, in the past, “doctors married
nurses and CEOs married their secretaries, and even when a highly educated man married
a highly educated woman, the woman was unlikely to work,” although that is no longer
the case).
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will trigger legal obligations. Existing approaches fail these daunting
challenges.
As discussed above, one approach involves the recognition of
contractual or equitable rights between unmarried cohabitants. This
approach is commonly associated with Marvin v. Marvin,143 a
landmark decision by the Supreme Court of California. The Marvin
court discarded public policy objections to the creation of enforceable
obligations between cohabitants and held that agreements not resting
on “meretricious consideration” could be enforced.144 In the forty
years following the Marvin decision, nearly all states began to accept
some form of contracting between cohabitants.145
If the challenge is to identify when individual preferences should
give rise to enforceable obligations, a contract approach would seem
ideal.146 But courts have struggled to implement the approach for
several reasons. First, as critics of Marvin have pointed out, “[p]eople
don’t generally make formal contracts about either the conduct of
their relationship or the consequences that ought to flow in the event
they end it.”147 They might be uninterested in arms-length bargaining
or incapable of achieving that self-interested distance.148
Second, courts have struggled to identify a workable standard for
ascertaining the parties’ subjective preferences and determining when
those preferences should justify legal obligations. Where the parties
have failed to enter an express agreement, courts must infer terms
from the parties’ conduct, which is largely an indeterminate inquiry
and gives courts license to impose their own ideas about fairness,
threatening the legitimacy of the process and dishonoring the
preferences of the parties.149 Agreements between cohabitants
frequently claim broad obligations based on the relationship as a

143. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 106.
144. Id. at 109–10.
145. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 47–48 (noting that all but three states recognize
some form of agreements between cohabitants). A notable exception is Illinois: within the
last year, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule, articulated in Hewitt v. Hewitt,
394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979), that “disfavor[s] private contractual alternatives to marriage or
the grant of property rights to unmarried cohabitants.” Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d
834, 852 (Ill. 2016) (citations omitted).
146. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1989).
147. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 874
(1999).
148. See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1365, 1373 (2001); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1832 (1985).
149. See Ellman, supra note 147, at 874–75; Ellman, supra note 146, at 20–23.
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whole.150 Marvin itself involved sweeping allegations—that the parties
would pool their earnings, share equally in all property acquired, and
provide support—based on the way the parties had lived their lives
for seven years.151 Indeed, without proof of discrete commitments,
courts have looked to conduct suggesting the broad commitment to
live like a married couple.152 Courts in states recognizing implied
agreements have generally been hostile to these claims.153 When
assessing the conduct giving rise to a party’s claims, courts will often
draw comparisons to an idealized view of marriage and find those
relationships wanting.154 In short, when contracts enter the intimate
realm, contract doctrine developed in other areas no longer seems to
apply.
An alternative approach is to regulate partners who stand in a
status relationship to each other. This approach focuses on the nature
of a cohabiting relationship rather than the parties’ commitments
when parceling out marriage-like rights.155
Thus far, a few courts have endorsed a status-based approach to
nonmarital regulation.156 Most famously, the State of Washington
grants legal rights to partners in committed intimate relationships,
formerly called “meretricious relationships,”157 when the parties
cohabit in a “stable, marital-like relationship . . . with knowledge that

150. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 147, at 874–75 (describing the problem as ascertaining
broad commitments “about the consequences of dissolution” from “conduct during a
relationship”).
151. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). In Marvin, the
plaintiff pleaded the existence of an express agreement, but the court allowed her to
amend her complaint to add theories of implied contract or equitable relief based on the
same conduct. See id.
152. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 10–11.
153. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 50–53. Even Michelle Marvin, on remand, failed
to establish the existence of an agreement, express or implied, and ended up with nothing.
Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see Ann Laquer Estin,
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2001) (detailing what
occurred after the remand).
154. See, e.g., Taylor v. Fields, 224 Cal. Rptr. 186, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting
the existence of a valid agreement between a decedent and his sexual partner of forty-two
years because they never lived together); see also Antognini, supra note 20, at 8–9; Estin,
supra note 153, at 1402–03 (noting that “[o]nly a small percentage of cohabitants will have
even a possibility of legal recovery when their relationships end”).
155. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1163–70.
156. Those two states are Alaska and Washington. See Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58,
62–63 (Alaska 2014); Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
Several Oregon intermediate appellate decisions also take a status approach. See, e.g.,
Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
157. See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 n.1 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
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a lawful marriage between them does not exist.”158 Courts examine
factors including “continuous cohabitation, duration of the
relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and
services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties” to determine
the relationship’s existence.159 If found to exist, courts will make a
“just and equitable distribution of the property” that would have
been community property if the couple married.160 It is unclear how
frequently committed-intimate-relationship claims arise, but the low
number of published appellate decisions suggests that actions are
correspondingly rare.
That said, the status approach has found favor with influential
legal scholars. For example, the ALI Principles propose that a couple
sharing a primary residence for a continuous period of time will be
presumptively entitled to the division of property acquired during the
course of the cohabiting relationship and, if applicable, compensatory
payments after the relationship comes to an end.161 One can rebut the
presumption by demonstrating that the parties did not share a life
together based on the consideration of various factors, including (1)
statements regarding their relationship, (2) the extent to which they
intermingled their finances, (3) the extent to which their relationship
fostered economic dependency, (4) whether they assumed specialized
or collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together, (5) their
emotional or physical intimacy, and (6) their reputation in the
community.162 However, a significant number of lengthy cohabitations
would result in property and support obligations running between the
partners.
The status approach discounts the subjective preferences of the
parties. Proponents, like Cynthia Bowman, have characterized these
proposals as imposing obligations on couples “without their

158. Connell, 898 P.2d at 834.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 835. “Alaska, like Washington, provides for marital-like property
distribution following a cohabitative relationship.” Boulds, 323 P.3d at 62–63. Alaska
courts use similar factors to the Washington courts to determine whether the parties
intended to create a partnership. See id. at 63. However, that determination does not
automatically result in marital property-like rights. See id. at 64. Rather, the courts will
examine whether the parties intended to share all property or just some subset. Id. This
semi-contractual, semi-status approach has produced status-like outcomes. See, e.g., id. at
64–65 (treating the relationship as marriage-like and dividing a pension); LongwayMarotta v. Nelson, No. S-16367, 2017 WL 5505390, at *2–3 (Alaska Nov. 15, 2017).
161. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.03–.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
162. § 6.03(7) (listing factors).
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consent.”163 Critics have likewise charged that status approaches give
too little weight to individual autonomy.164
Because proponents of status approaches understand those
approaches to be based on something other than consent, they have
looked to alternative justificatory rationales that do not depend on
the preferences of the parties. Alternatives include the creation of
dependency, as when one’s conduct results in the birth of a vulnerable
child165; the degree of subjective “closeness,” as implied by the ALI’s
consideration of “emotional intimacy” and “qualitative[]
distinct[iveness] from previous relationships”166; the promotion of
equality between partners, especially to compensate benefits
conferred during the course of the relationship167; or simply the
treatment of like relationships—marriage and “almost-marriage”—
alike.
These rationales suffer from over- and under-inclusiveness. That
is because cohabiting relationships are not the only adult relationships
that create dependency or are characterized by emotional closeness
or sacrifice. Parents and their children, or siblings, for example, may
pool resources, develop patterns of dependency, and be as
emotionally connected as intimate partners.168
The rationales are also unsatisfying. The dependency-creation
rationale struggles to define dependency in absolute terms or to
account for the agency of both partners. Imagine two associates at a
major law firm earning approximately $200,000, one of whom leaves
to take a job as a court staff attorney with a $100,000 salary because
he wants to spend more time with his child and because he does not
enjoy law firm life. Three years later, he and his partner break up.
163. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 224 (noting that her proposal would impose
obligations based on the length of the partners’ relationship “without their consent, similar
to the proposal of the American Law Institute”).
164. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 856; see also Shahar
Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587–88 (2009); David Westfall, Forcing
Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s Principles
of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001) (discussing the ALI
Principles’ treatment of relationships as a “mandate” for unmarried cohabitants).
165. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 826–29.
166. See id. at 831–32; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(7).
167. See BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 227 (describing ways in which a cohabitant can
benefit the other partner by “contribut[ing] to household expenses, devot[ing] labor to
[the] partner’s business, or simply tak[ing] care of the house and children); Garrison, Is
Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 873–74 (correcting power imbalances).
168. See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 11, at 386–87 (describing a interdependent
relationship between sisters who lived together for seventy-six years).
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Assume he has been out-earned by over $400,000; has he been placed
in a vulnerable or losing position owing to the relationship? On an
absolute scale, $100,000 in annual income is generous; and nothing
about his education or background suggests that his choices were
constrained.169 Additionally, unlike the vertical relationship between
parent and child, where the child has no meaningful choice in creating
the vulnerable situation in which he finds himself, the horizontal
relationship between adults must account for individual agency: the
rationale does not explain the choices for which one’s partner should
bear responsibility.
The equalization rationale suffers from several deficiencies. Most
importantly, it does not identify which relationships should be subject
to redistribution but rather only what should happen when such
relationships are already identified. Financial inequality alone does
not create an obligation. For example, it does not explain why a
wealthy roommate should not have to share his income with a less
wealthy roommate, nor why a casual one-night stand with a wealthy
person should not result in ongoing redistribution. Moreover, an
insistence upon egalitarianism struggles to account for the myriad
ways in which partners are differently situated—for example, in terms
of their personal histories, values, and priorities—as well as the
cumulative effects of their choices.170 And many relationships will
have more liabilities than assets, resulting in the redistribution of
(potentially unforeseen) obligations rather than support.171
The functional rationale posits that relationships that are similar
enough to marriages should be treated as marriages. The ALI
Principles, for example, propose a set of rules presuming that adults
without children who have cohabited for a sufficient length of time
will be in relationships that “may be indistinguishable from marriage
except for the legal formality of marriage.”172 But it is not clear what
the hallmarks of marriage are: many marriages do not bear all the

169. As Marsha Garrison has argued, the partner might have benefited financially from
the economies of scale and time created by sharing a residence. Garrison, Is Consent
Necessary?, supra note 25, at 874–75.
170. See Schneider, supra note 148, at 1831.
171. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 573–74
(4th ed. 2015) (noting that most families facing divorce have a low net worth, and a
significant portion have only liabilities).
172. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 1, Overview of Chapter 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (footnote
omitted).
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hallmarks of marriage.173 The skein of rights and obligations
associated with marriage cluster around separate, sometimes
incoherent objectives,174 barely held together by marriage’s relatively
coherent social and legal meaning.175 As a result, attempts to
analogize “to marriage,” here and in the contract context, invite a
comparison to an idealized, middle-class relationship.176 The task of
analogizing runs a significant risk of improper fit, especially given the
idiosyncrasies of nonmarital relationships and the class- and racebased variations discussed in Section I.A. The consequences of this
mismatch are the imposition of unwanted legal obligations or the
denial of desired legal rights.
* * *
Existing approaches may sometimes extend rights and
obligations to people in nonmarital relationships but only
haphazardly. The failure to enact more consistent, coherent
regulation stems from the absence of a justificatory rationale that

173. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2005);
Regan, supra note 25, at 1448 (noting that spouses may not share a common residence,
sleep in the same bed, maintain joint bank accounts, or maintain sexual exclusivity).
174. Some scholars have observed the extent to which the state has pinned
questionably related rights and obligations on marriage and have called for disaggregation
of these rights. See infra notes 279–306 and accompanying text.
175. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2048–49; Scott & Scott, supra note 44, at 306–13.
176. The Reporters of the ALI Principles noted that “[d]omestic partners fail to marry
for diverse reasons,” including that “some ethnic and social groups have a substantially
lower incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of informal domestic
relationships than do others.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.02 cmt. a. But their proposal does not take these
differences into account. The choice of a one-size-fits-all solution disregards the reasons
why people in certain demographic groups do not marry, see supra Section I.A.3. My
suspicion is that the Reporters were more concerned about instances of “strong social or
economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to resist the
weaker partner’s preference for marriage.” § 6.02 cmt. a. The roots of this concern can be
found in Reporter Grace Ganz Blumberg’s important Article, supra note 29, in which
Blumberg has focused on gender dynamics that disfavor women:
Self-interest would lead the man to give up as little as possible. The woman has
scant leverage with which to persuade him otherwise. She lacks economic power.
She needs a stable relationship more than he does: it is vital to the comfortable
exercise of her reproductive potential, and it is a means of enhancing her wealth
and standard of living. . . . Even a feminist must agree that there is ample economic
and biological basis for Midge Decter’s assertion that “marriage is something
asked by women and agreed to by men.”
Id. at 1163. The solution proposed by the ALI Principles to impose marriage-like inter se
obligations makes more sense in light of these concerns. Id. at 1163.
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appropriately balances concerns about individual will, conduct, and
consequences. Consent supplies that rationale.
II. WHY CONSENT?
Consent is a concept capable of multiple interpretations. This
Part defines consent and defends its relevance in the context of
intimate regulation.
A. Choice and Authorization
Although they have not arrived at a consensus about an
appropriate regulatory approach, courts, scholars, and policymakers
generally agree that the law should recognize informal nonmarital
relationships in some circumstances. Moreover, both the implied
contract and implied status approaches agree that legal obligations
can stem from conduct, rather than express commitments.177 And
despite statements to the contrary,178 the status approach does not
discount will entirely. In drafting the ALI Principles, for example, the
Reporters gave significant weight to “what the parties themselves
expected” and “emotional intimacy”179: subjective features. Status
approaches also allow parties to contract out of the default status,
preserving a space for the exercise of individual preferences.180
There are many challenges with designing a legal rule around a
person’s subjective will, including that those views are difficult to
prove and subject to change.181 Nonetheless, it would be particularly
inappropriate to discount the will of the parties in the context of
choosing their relationships. The Supreme Court has recognized
centrality of such exercises of will to one’s right of self-definition.182
For example, the Court described the choice to marry as “inherent in
the concept of individual autonomy[,]” and “among the most intimate
that an individual can make.”183 So too, I have argued, is the decision

177. See supra Section I.B.
178. See supra text accompanying note 163.
179. Ellman, supra note 147, at 873, 883 (explaining the rationales underlying the
regulation of long-term intimate relationships).
180. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.01(2). Although Professor Bowman’s proposal would apply an
irrebuttable presumption after two years of cohabitation, she too would allow parties to
contract out of this status, indicating her sympathy to the importance of will/autonomy.
BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 228.
181. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2052–53.
182. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1509, 1532–33 (2016) (discussing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
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not to marry.184 The choice to engage in private, consensual intimate
conduct, even outside of marriage, is also one with which the state
cannot interfere.185
There is therefore broad agreement that will, conduct, and their
relationship to consequences matter. A successful regulatory
approach must balance those considerations.
Consent is a tool for mediating the relationship between
individual action and the legitimate exercise of state authority.
Although consent has long been the subject of philosophical
exploration and uncertainty,186 the law has consistently treated
consent as a justification for the exercise of state power and as the
basis for the creation or adjustment of legal relationships between
individuals.187
184. See Matsumura, supra note 182, at 1541–42.
185. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
186. For centuries, political philosophers have struggled to identify the source of
individual obligation to obey a jurisdiction’s laws, and the extent to which it stems from
consent, whether actual or hypothetical. See Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political
Obligation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Aug. 7, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/political-obligation/ [https://perma.cc/8B68-BXZK (dark archive)] (“[T]he history of
political thought is replete with attempts to provide a satisfactory account of political
obligation, from the time of Socrates to the present. These attempts have become
increasingly sophisticated in recent years, but they have brought us no closer to
agreement.”); see also DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT
THEORY 1–4 (1989) (identifying questions raised by consent theory, including who needs
to consent (and to what), how to consent, and when to consent). Social contractarians,
including John Locke, have argued that individuals’ duty to submit to the State’s authority
stems from individuals’ authority to bind themselves, and the exercise of that normative
power in creating the State. See Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher,
Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 31,
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ [https://perma.cc
/32MA-LVM7 (dark archive)]. Critics of the social contract theory have challenged the
accuracy of asserting that anyone ever granted consent. John Rawls has argued that
though people cannot consent in advance to participate in society in a “literal sense,”
“[o]ur social situation is just if it is such that by [a] sequence of hypothetical agreements
we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it.” JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (1971). Although this original position is purely
hypothetical, it still reveals the principles, “moral or otherwise[,] . . . that we do in fact
accept.” Id. at 21. In response, some have argued that hypothetical consent, what one
might have agreed to if asked in advance, has no force as consent and depends instead
upon the reasons why it might be fair or proper to enforce rules nonetheless, rendering
consent superfluous. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16,
18 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
187. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 901 (arguing that an “abiding, almost obsessive
suspicion of state power” lives on in an “American political culture [that] still presumes
that the most legitimate ground for binding individuals is their consent to the
transaction”); cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
(proclaiming that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the
governed”).
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Consent is both “a decision in favor of a proposed course of
action” and “a permission-giving act.”188 Consent therefore stems
from individual will: the “ability to select a course of action as a
means of fulfilling some desire.”189 But that decision itself raises
complicated questions. For instance, the exercise of will is inevitably
constrained by one’s circumstances. This raises the question whether
consent requires unfettered choice or can exist when a person has a
more limited range of options. Moreover, standards for identifying or
proving the exercise of will can affect the extent to which the law
protects it. For example, imagine a person who participates in a
wedding ceremony and publicly says “I do,” yet harbors internal
reservations about the decision to marry.190 The adoption of an
objective standard of proof could hold her responsible for her public
statements notwithstanding her hidden preferences to the contrary.
The adoption of a subjective approach, in contrast, would credit her
internal desires, although proving those desires would be
complicated. The decisional component of consent therefore involves
a conclusion about the nexus between will and conduct.
The law may be satisfied by different manifestations of will
depending on the circumstances.191 For example, within the context of
consent to sexual relations, Heidi Hurd has argued that consent
should focus entirely on a person’s subjective will.192 She argues that
autonomy resides in the ability to will the alteration of moral rights
and duties.193 If consent is normatively significant because it
constitutes an expression of autonomy, then it must depend on the
person’s state of mind at the relevant time.194 If the purpose of
requiring the performance of a token act is merely to reflect the
188. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 57.
189. Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 29, 2010),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ [https://perma.cc/NCM9-9JT6 (dark archive)].
190. See Jackson K. v. Parisa G., 37 N.Y.S.3d 207, 2016 WL 1689184, at *9 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2016) (unpublished table opinion).
191. See Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 30, at 251,
255 (“[I]t serves neither autonomy nor welfare to demand the fullest form of consent
before we treat the relevant moral or legal threshold as being met.”); Alan Wertheimer,
Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 30, at 195, 196 (“The
criteria for what constitutes [morally transformative] consent will always involve moral
argument and empirical evidence that is sensitive to the reasons for adopting a more or
less rigorous view of [morally transformative consent for the law].”); Beauchamp, supra
note 30, at 58 (arguing that it could be “unreasonable to demand . . . [a]utonomyprotective standards [that are] excessively difficult or impossible to implement”).
192. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 124–25 (1996).
193. Id. at 124.
194. Id.; see also Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL
THEORY 165, 165 (1996).
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mental state, then the act itself is morally irrelevant.195 This proposed
definition of consent emphasizes the importance of subjective will to
the exclusion of objectively measurable authorization. Challenging
this subjective approach, Alan Wertheimer has argued that if consent
renders it permissible for A to do something to B, then B’s mental
state alone—unaccompanied by any outward manifestation—would
be incapable of authorizing A to act.196 He has therefore argued in
favor of a “suitably qualified performative view” that “takes account
of the background conditions within which [one] gives a token of
consent.”197 Within the context of contract law, an objective approach
has come to dominate the doctrinal analysis of contractual assent. To
privilege subjective intent over objectively manifested behavior
would, at best, promote uncertainty as to the terms of the agreement,
and, at worst, incentivize contracting parties to generate evidence of
contradictory intentions with which to undermine the validity of
unfavorable agreements.198 Contract law has therefore largely treated
the relevant acts of will as objective ones.199
Consent is also an authorization: it justifies the imposition of
legal obligations.200 Although discussions of consent tend to collapse
the will and authorization inquiries, an expression—e.g., a statement
of terms followed by “I agree”—or an act—e.g., accepting a shipment
of goods—might prove one but not the other. For example, most of us
regularly click through online form agreements, indicating that we

195. See Hurd, supra note 192, at 137.
196. See Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 557, 568 (2000).
197. Id. at 571.
198. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 647, 651 (2012); Barnett, supra note 35, at 635.
199. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521 (Va. 1954) (“In the field of contracts,
as generally elsewhere, ‘[w]e must look to the outward expression of a person as
manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention. The law
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words
and acts.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Roanoke v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770
(Va. 1937))); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,
303 (1986) (arguing that “whether one has consented to a transfer of rights . . . generally
depends not on one’s subjective opinion about the meaning of one’s freely chosen words
or conduct, but on the ordinary meaning that is attached to them”); Wertheimer, supra
note 196, at 567–68 (“As a general proposition, no one thinks that the consent that gives
rise to a binding promise refers to anyone’s mental state. To promise is to promise, not to
have the intent or desire to promise.”).
200. The concept of consent also plays a role in determining the moral duties owed by
private individuals—i.e., how we should treat one another. But my focus is on the role
consent plays in the creation of a legal relationship—i.e., one that the state will enforce
through its coercive power.
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have read and agree to terms and conditions that we have not seen.201
The act of checking boxes arguably offers express proof of
authorization202 but not necessarily of will.203 Here, lack of knowledge
of terms and conditions would prevent a decision in their favor.
Similarly, physicians’ common practice of obtaining informed
consent—disclosing risks, proposing a course of action, and obtaining
a signed consent form—provides evidence of something, although
scholars are skeptical about whether patients can truly understand the
consequences of the procedure they are authorizing.204
As an authorization, consent has been treated as critical to the
creation of particularized legal duties running between contracting
parties.205 It builds, from the ground up, specific legal obligations that
otherwise would not exist. Although tort operates in the opposite
direction, imposing liability for “conduct the law treats as wrong,”206 a
tort plaintiff’s consent to the defendant’s conduct “marks a deficiency
in [a] prima facie case at the most fundamental level: where the
plaintiff consents, the defendant’s act is simply not tortious.”207
Admittedly, the law places limits on consent by balancing it with
other values. In the tort context, for example, courts have limited
defenses like assumption of the risk and product warnings and have
imposed heightened informed consent requirements governing
health-care-related injuries.208 And in the contract realm, doctrines
like substantive unconscionability209 and public policy,210 as well as the
201. See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 37, at 126–28.
202. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 635 (analogizing clicking a box on an online click
license agreement to agreeing to perform whatever a trusted friend specifies in a sealed
letter, the contents of which are unknown).
203. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 37, at 124–26 (noting that most consumers are not
actually aware of terms, leading courts to ask whether the consumers had reasonable
notice of the existence of the terms).
204. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 58 (questioning patients’ substantive
understanding of the procedures to which they purportedly consent).
205. See Radin, supra note 37, at 508 (“A core contract, in the sense of traditional
theories, (i) shifts particular entitlements between two private parties, in a context of
exchange between them, where (ii) the parties to the exchange are human beings who
possess free will or autonomy, . . . and where (iii) each party arrives at and commits to a
particular specific exchange, a consensus ad idem, through exercise of the party’s own free
will or autonomy.” (footnote omitted)).
206. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 12 (2d ed., West 2011 & Supp. 2017).
207. Id. § 105 (noting that “[t]he consent principle is general in its scope, firm in its
acceptance, and central in its significance”); see also Schuck, supra note 34, at 902
(observing that consent by the victim relieves the injurer of the duty she owes and also
makes her conduct non-faulty).
208. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 907–08.
209. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
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expanded use of custom, trade usage, and changed circumstances,
place limits on what parties can consent to and how strictly those
terms are to be interpreted.211 These rules effectively make it more
difficult for individuals to authorize the wrongful conduct of another
or to create enforceable duties. But they have not erased the
fundamental importance of consent to the legal relations imposed
upon private individuals.
These inquiries reveal that consent is not a rigid concept capable
of universal application. Rather, it is a conclusion that a particular
exercise of will justifies the imposition of legal consequences when
balanced against other considerations. To say that consent is required
is therefore to raise the question of the appropriateness of the state’s
exercise of authority under the circumstances.
B.

Addressing Consent Skepticism

Thus far, I have argued that from a legal perspective, consent is a
conclusion about the relationship between the individual and the
state. Unless one takes the position that individual will imposes no
limits on the exercise of state authority, consent is inescapable.
However, many scholars have expressed skepticism that consent is
relevant to the imposition of legal obligations on people in intimate
relationships. Their arguments provide a useful tool to sharpen the
concepts discussed in the previous Section.
First, critics of consent argue that because it is impossible for
people to contemplate, much less will, all the ways the law will affect
marriage or marriage-like relationships, consent is not worth pursuing
as an explanatory rationale. This argument implicitly defines consent
as synonymous with will and insists on a glovelike fit between will and
particularized obligations: that people can only will that which they
directly contemplate. Further, they contend that the definition of
consent cannot allow a looser fit between will and obligation because
such an expanded definition would render the concept of consent
meaningless. Such a watered-down definition would require “little
more than a willingness to be part of a society that recognizes
obligations toward others.”212 Second, the law has frequently imposed
duties between adults and children over a party’s (usually a man’s)
objections. For example, the law has forced statutory rape victims to
pay child support for their biological children, imposed obligations on

210. See id. § 178.
211. See Linzer, supra note 33, at 142.
212. Id.
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fathers who were affirmatively deceived by their partners, and even
imposed obligations on men whose sperm was misappropriated. If
consent is irrelevant to the imposition of obligations in the vertical
parent-child relationship, why should it be necessary in a horizontal
relationship between adults? And third, critics of consent are
suspicious of neoliberal commitments to existing property
entitlements and argue that consent inherently preserves
distributional inequalities. I address these arguments in turn.
The first argument evokes and then critiques a definition of
consent that virtually equates consent with subjective will. Nancy
Polikoff, for example, argues that consent rests on a “fatal flaw”: “the
premise that those who marry or do not marry accurately understand
the legally enforceable economic obligations that each will have
towards the other.”213 Relatedly, Ira Ellman has cautioned against
“inferring understandings very freely from the parties’ conduct.”214
These arguments insist that the parties manifest a subjective
understanding about the specific legal consequences that would flow
from their actions in order to consent to those consequences. Where
the parties were not even aware of, much less willed, those
consequences, consent has no explanatory role.215
Implicit in the strictness of this definition is skepticism about the
consequences of stretching consent too far. The skeptics have a point.
For example, within the political theory context, John Locke argued
that “every man, that hath any possession, or enjoyment, of any part
of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit
consent, . . . whether this his possession be of land, . . . or whether it be
barely travelling freely on the highway.”216 The notion that by
traveling on the highway one consents to obey this country’s system
of laws may seem absurd because of the attenuated relationship
between the act and the thing it is supposed to justify.217 The
challenge faced by Locke is the challenge faced by consent generally.

213. Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner
Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 370.
214. Ellman, supra note 147, at 874; see also id. at 874–75 (“It is arguably likely that
even couples with very clear understandings about their conduct during marriage never
had any common understanding about the consequences of dissolution.” (emphasis
added)).
215. Polikoff, supra note 213, at 372.
216. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 113, 176 (Mark Goldie ed., 1993) (1698) (emphasis added).
217. See HERZOG, supra note 186, at 184 (“If tacit consent reaches as far as the brute
fact of residence, regardless of one’s alternatives, regardless of one’s reasons for remaining
. . . it reaches too far.”).
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Consent theorists . . . need a conception of consent that is
descriptively plausible: they need to be able to point at citizens
and show us their consent. But that conception also needs to be
normatively robust: whatever counts as consent has to generate
an obligation. These two requirements pull in different
directions.218
The looser the fit between act and obligation, the less the act looks
like consent.
That said, as I argued in the previous Section, there is no single
definition of consent.219 Rather, a definition should consider “what is
fair and reasonable to require in circumstances of practice.”220 One
might not see consent as especially important in situations that are
morally straightforward; for example, when imposing a generalized
duty not to harm a passersby unnecessarily.221 But in a morally
complicated area like consent to sexual relations, the law might insist
on a greater fit between the parties’ will and the permission-giving
act.222 The same distinction could be made between duties owed to all
versus special duties owed to one, or a few: the law might reasonably
require a tighter fit between will, act, and consequence in the latter
context.
In few other contexts has the law required as strict a definition as
the one consent critics advocate. As I will argue at length in the next
Section, contract doctrine balances the parties’ preferences against
the fact that it would be impossible to contemplate, much less
memorialize, all of their views about the different legal and factual
permutations within a single agreement.223 At bottom, arguments
about the definition of consent are not arguments against the
functions that consent performs. I doubt that critics of consent would
authorize the state to make a person responsible for an adult or child
to whom the person has little apparent connection, like a stranger
living on the other side of town.

218. Id. at 185.
219. See supra note 191.
220. Beauchamp, supra note 30, at 58.
221. See Cynthia A. Stark, Hypothetical Consent and Justification, 97 J. PHIL. 313, 318
(2000) (noting that critiques of hypothetical consent “are not concerned with the problem
of the bindingness of moral rules generally, but rather with the bindingness of those
principles to which one might think consent is especially relevant”).
222. The importance of these interests is why the topic of consent to sexual relations
has remained controversial, as the recent college affirmative-consent policies attest. See,
e.g., Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 889
(2016).
223. See infra Section III.A.
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The second argument is that the law imposes family obligations
without consent all the time. If consent is not required to impose
obligations in one type of family relationship (between parents and
children), then it should not be required to impose obligations in
another type of family relationship (between adults). Parental
obligations have traditionally flowed from consanguinity or status.224
These obligations have been imposed in cases where the facts suggest
that men did not intend to have a child, but the law imposed
fatherhood nonetheless, for example where a man’s partner promised
not to hold him responsible for the child225; misrepresented her
fertility226; engaged in sex with a minor not capable of offering legal
consent227; or appropriated his sperm and inseminated herself.228
Once one rejects the view that consent and will are synonymous,
however, it is not clear that consent plays no role in the imposition of
duties between parent and child. The unwanted fatherhood cases
involve voluntary acts from which parenthood might predictably flow.
In State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer,229 for example, a minor father
who was only thirteen years old at the time of conception argued that
he was not legally capable of consenting to sexual intercourse and
therefore could not have consented to the birth of his child.230 But
when analyzing voluntariness, the court noted that “the sexual
relationship . . . lasted over a period of several months. At no time did
Shane register any complaint to his parents about the sexual liaison.”231
The court later concluded that the infant, “the only truly innocent
party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of their

224. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 826; Michael J. Higdon,
Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers: A Feminist Look at the Reproductive
Freedom of Unmarried Men, 66 ALA. L. REV. 507, 517 (2015); Emily J. Stolzenberg, The
New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 22–23) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
225. See, e.g., Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (rejecting a
man’s contention that he only agreed to father a child because the child’s mother promised
that he would not be held responsible for the child’s financial support).
226. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2007) (involving the
imposition of child support upon a man who had sex with the child’s mother after she
assured him that she was both infertile and using birth control).
227. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Kan. 1993)
(imposing child support obligations on a minor who was thirteen years old when he had
sex and conceived a child with his babysitter who was seventeen years old at the time).
228. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *1–3 (Ill. Ct. App.
Feb. 22, 2005) (involving a woman’s unconsented use of sperm collected in a condom after
oral sex in order to conceive).
229. 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993).
230. Id. at 1275.
231. Id. at 1277 (emphasis added).
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ages.”232 These statements indicate that the court viewed the
imposition of parenthood as a reasonable consequence of the father’s
voluntary actions.233 Especially in light of the strong policies favoring
the support of “innocent” children, one can interpret this result as
adopting an objective approach within a consent framework.
Even if the imposition of vertical duties rejects consent, the
departure is typically justified by dependency creation: the adults
involved have caused the child’s dependency and therefore owe the
child duties of support.234 This rationale applies with much less force
in the horizontal context. It is easier to argue that children have no
role in the creation of dependency because they exercise no agency in
their birth nor in the circumstances in which they find themselves. In
contrast, even granting that adults operate within circumstances of
constraint, it is difficult to argue that a competent adult had a
comparably reduced level of agency in the nonmarital relationship.235
The third argument against consent is that it instantiates
neoliberal assumptions about property relations that are antithetical
to the family. Neoliberalism describes an ideology that promotes the
expansion of market logic—specifically, an individualistic,
232. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
233. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
255, 293–300 (2011). There are, admittedly, a few instances in which the law has imposed
parental obligations on men who did not voluntarily participate in a child’s creation. See
Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 24–26 (collecting cases). In these situations, as well as those
in which obligations are imposed over a person’s express non-consent, it is perhaps futile
to justify the obligation on this basis. This Article focuses on the obligations between
adults and the state, so the question whether the law should revisit vertical obligations is
beyond the scope of this Article, although others have contested this issue.
234. Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828. Martha Fineman has
argued that the inevitable dependency created by the mother-child relationship is so
important that it should displace the marital relationship as the central family relationship
recognized by the state. See FINEMAN, supra note 114, at 228. With the state playing a
supportive, nurturing role, the focus would not be on consent, but rather on the
caretaker/dependent relationship. See id. at 233–35. But she distinguishes purely adult
relationships, in which “the interactions of female and male sexual affiliates would be
governed by the same rules that regulate other interactions in our society—specifically
those of contract and property.” Id. at 229.
235. When women were prevented from exercising full control over property and were
discouraged from participating in the economic sphere, the comparison to children may
have been more appropriate. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 828–
29 (explaining the burdens of coverture historically justified support obligations).
Although women have not yet achieved economic equality, the analogy to children seems
extreme when considering modern marital relationships. See id. at 874–77 (noting the
absence of persuasive evidence that women are systematically exploited in cohabiting
relationships); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 109 (explaining that the two traditional
restrictions on women which resulted in dependency on men, including labor restrictions
and lack of contraception, are no longer prevalent in society).
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unencumbered, wealth-maximizing ethos—to all social and legal
realms.236 Anne Alstott has argued that “[i]n family law, three
neoliberal ideals dominate both constitutional and subconstitutional
law: negative liberty, market distribution, and the minimal state.”237
Although consent typically has an unobjectionable moral valence—
for instance, few argue that we should promote nonconsensual sexual
relations—its legal significance is often associated with the concept of
unfettered economic exchange.238
The association of consent and market logic has led to several
distinct concerns. Scholars have argued that to the extent that the law
equates autonomy with one’s choice of financial obligations, it
reinforces the notion that people are individual economic units.239
This individualistic approach is incompatible with the
interdependency that develops within familial relationships and
therefore fails to credit the joint contributions and the (sometimes
contrary) expectations of both partners.240 Approaching adult
relationships through the lens of economic exchange may destabilize
“intimate relationships’ cooperative, collaborative qualities.”241
Moreover, requiring consent may hinder the necessary redistribution
of resources or legitimize distributional inequalities. To the extent
they fail to question the allocation of entitlements in the first instance,
consent theory risks cementing them.242 For example, before we
determine whether an employer has bargained away with his
employee the right to fire that employee at will, we have to determine
whether he has that right in the first place; if he is motivated by race
or sex, the law might deprive him of such a right.243 In the domestic
context, consent can obscure the fact that decisions are not always
made on an even playing field. If one partner earns somewhat less
236. See Melissa Murray & Karen Tani, Something Old, Something New: Reflections on
the Sex Bureaucracy, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 122, 152–53 (2016).
237. Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and LaissezFaire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26–27 (2014).
238. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 199, at 297 (describing contract law as the libertarian
exchange of already vested entitlements).
239. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1136–37; Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 51.
240. Stolzenberg, supra note 224, at 52–56.
241. Id. at 57–58.
242. See Braucher, supra note 36, at 712–13 (“Interrelated elements of wealth, power,
knowledge, and judgment of the parties constitute the conditions in which they make
choices or undertake relationships. Choices, relationships, entitlements, and abilities
cannot be separated.”); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV.
1, 21–22 (1989) (noting that “the prior assignment of rights and obligations” affects
consent).
243. Peter Linzer, Is Consent the Essence of Contract?—Replying to Four Critics, 1988
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 213, 220 n.11.
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and provides more care of a dependent child, for example, seemingly
equal contributions to household expenses will result in the higher
earning partner having more income to keep for himself.244
These concerns rightfully arise the more the law favors a
subjective definition of consent. If one’s consent were only valid if
one subjectively willed the precise obligation at hand, redistribution
would be rare indeed. But that consent can accompany the
perpetuation of a market ideology in the family realm does not
suggest that it must. Consent is not inconsistent with the recognition
of positive rights nor does it require a minimal state; it simply ensures,
in light of the existing state of affairs, that the state justify its exercise
of authority.245 A definition of consent that insists upon a tight fit
between subjective will and the objective conduct triggering legal
obligations, coupled with heightened proof requirements and a rigid
understanding of property concepts like title and vested rights, will
produce neoliberal outcomes. But a different consent framework
could produce different outcomes.
Finally, consent does not shield underlying entitlements from
searching analysis. The law makes determinations about the
alienability of objects and actions, thereby altering their status as
property.246 For example, some workers cannot sell more than forty
hours of their labor per week without requiring a higher overtime
wage. The law should calibrate these rules to respond to the sources
of inequality rather than attempting piecemeal remediation on the
backs of individuals who happen to be in intimate relationships. If
gender disparities in salaries or educational opportunities place
women in a disadvantageous position compared to their male
partners, the law should address those inequalities directly rather
than through the happenstance of the person with whom any given
woman is cohabiting.247
The concerns I respond to in this Section sharpen several aspects
of consent that are useful going forward. They reveal that consent is
context-dependent and can vary in terms of the extent to which it
emphasizes the importance of will and authorization. Consent does
244. BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 170.
245. See Brilmayer, supra note 242, at 23 (arguing that “[c]onsent is a process value,
not a justification of a particular state of affairs”).
246. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987) (exploring the significance of market-inalienability and its justifications).
247. If gender-based earning disparities were to justify redistribution, they would have
no effect in a relationship with a lower earning man or another woman. In those
relationships, as in situations involving single women, the law would fail to address the
problem of wage discrimination.
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not justify existing entitlements but instead governs the way that the
state alters them. Above all, consent highlights the relationship
between individual freedom and state regulation.
III. CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION
This Part articulates two methodological refinements for
determining whether parties have consented to the imposition of
intimate obligations. The first focuses on identifying the act of
consent. The second focuses on how to define the object of consent.
A. Determining the Act of Consent
I have shown that consent is an analytic framework that insists
upon different relationships between will and authorization
depending on the context. The challenge in any given context is to
articulate a definition of consent that appropriately balances will,
conduct, and the policy considerations that justify the exercise of state
power. This is the very inquiry that has both evaded and confounded
regulatory efforts to this point. As revealed in Section I.B., courts and
scholars have battled about a caricature of consent without
considering what consent to the imposition of legal obligations
between partners and the state should actually look like.248
A key challenge to the imposition of obligations on people in
nonmarital relationships is the diversity of relationship structures and
the complicated relationship between those diverse forms and the
partners’ subjective views. As a law of voluntary obligations arising
within idiosyncratic relationships, contract law has clear parallels to
nonmarital relationships. Although I have previously argued for
greater enforcement of contracts between nonmarital partners,249 that
is not my argument here. Rather, I contend here that when looking
for principles that explain the relationship between will, conduct, and
corresponding obligations, contract doctrine may be a useful guide.
The concept of consent is at the core of classical contract
doctrine. Contract law creates a legal relationship between parties
based on the terms to which they have assented: that legal
relationship would not exist absent the parties’ consent.250
248. See Joo, supra note 26, at 162 (noting that in the realm of intimate relationships,
courts and scholars have imported a “market-libertarian normative view about the role of
bargaining”).
249. See Matsumura, supra note 21, at 215.
250. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent.”); Bix, supra note 191, at 251 (noting the common view that consent is “at
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Assumptions about consent explain why most people would find it
shocking if the act of walking down a street and glancing in a store
window would create a legal obligation to purchase a product
displayed there at the listed price. Depending on how one defines it,
however, consent is missing in virtually all contracting situations.
Contracts are always incomplete, making it impossible to
attribute all the legal consequences that may be imposed to the
parties’ will. In the first place, “[b]ecause parties cannot predict
uncertain future events or states of the world, ex ante, they lack
information needed for complete contracts . . . . Consequently, parties
cannot realistically achieve complete contracts, and many contracts
remain inefficiently incomplete.”251 For example, the inclusion of the
term “US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A . . . 2 ½–3 lbs” in a contract
between a buyer and seller of poultry may seem sufficiently clear until
a dispute arises as to whether the term “chicken” means only young
birds or older “stewing chicken” meeting the size and quality
requirements.252 It is not always clear what meanings lie beneath the
surface of even the simplest of terms; further specification (chickens
of a certain breed or color) is always possible but would make
agreements impossibly long and unwieldy.
Moreover, as Professor Richard Craswell has demonstrated,
parties are bound by background rules—“those parts of contract law

the essence of contract law”); Kostritsky, supra note 36, at 331 (“The justification for
contract law rests on the assent of the parties.”); Schuck, supra note 34, at 900 (“Consent is
the master concept that defines the law of contracts in the United States.”). This is not to
say that consent is the sole justification for enforcing agreements. Numerous scholars have
observed that the law will sometimes impose non-consensual obligations based on a
party’s conduct or social policy. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 36, at 701 (noting that legal
decision-makers have the authority to assess the validity of consent, “mold obligations
along socially desired lines,” and “supply a great deal of the content of contractual
obligation,” undermining the position of consent as an individual-based obligation); Orit
Gan, The Many Faces of Contractual Consent, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 615, 617 (2017) (arguing
that the law should recognize “shades” of consent); Linzer, supra note 33, at 142
(“[C]onsent is far from indispensable today, and . . . is increasingly being seen as only one
of a number of factors affecting contract-like liability.”). Courts will also refuse to enforce
agreements to which the parties consented based on their own “policy evaluation about
the substance of the agreement.” Joo, supra note 26, at 181; see also Nancy S. Kim,
Relative Consent and Contract Law, 18 NEV. L.J. 165, 176–78 (2017) (arguing that consent
may be withdrawn or “destroyed” under certain conditions). I neither advance nor defend
the view that contract is solely based on consent. Rather, I argue that consent is typically
viewed as a central guiding concept, an argument with which even those critical of consent
seem to agree. See Linzer, supra note 33, at 142 (“This is not to say that consent is
irrelevant.”).
251. Kostritsky, supra note 36, at 335.
252. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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that govern the proper remedies for breach, the conditions under
which the promisor is excused from her duty to perform, or the
additional obligations (such as implied warranties) imputed to the
promisor as an implicit part of her promise”—that will impact the
parties’ rights but over which they may have little control.253 Parties
may have no knowledge of these terms or may not have selected them
if given the opportunity. These problems arise even in the context of
arms-length negotiations between sophisticated parties represented
by legal counsel. But there is a whole category of exchanges currently
subsumed under the rubric of contract law that do not involve
negotiations in the traditional sense. These transactions are governed
by boilerplate terms—“composite rigid texts, most often consisting of
fine print, delivered to consumers, employees, and many businesses in
the position of consumers”254—that parties agree to by clicking “I
accept” on a webpage or even by browsing a website.255
One response to the parties’ inability to will the entirety of their
agreements is to reject the value of consent as an explanatory
concept, as some family law scholars have done.256 But among
contract scholars, even skeptics of consent are not willing to go that
far. For example, although Jean Braucher argues that consent
overemphasizes contract’s private functions and does not credit the
extent to which contract is regulatory, she only goes so far as to argue
that “[c]onsent will not work as a rationale to enforce contracts
without also bringing in social control of the parties’ affairs.”257
Margaret Radin, one of the staunchest critics of form agreements,
argues that those “agreements” should be removed from the rubric of
contract and subjected to regulation under legal theories like tort law
rather than arguing against the centrality of consent to contract.258
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the role of consent
in contract is settled as a theoretical matter. But contract doctrine has
developed useful tools to deal with the practical problem of
incomplete agreements within diverse relationships. The first is that
the law has defined the doctrine of mutual assent or consensus ad
idem loosely: “both parties must understand and freely consent to one
and the same exchange, without necessarily assuming that each party

253. See Craswell, supra note 35, at 489–90; see also Bix, supra note 191, at 251;
Braucher, supra note 36, at 730.
254. Radin, supra note 37, at 515–16.
255. See id. at 519–20.
256. See supra Section II.B.
257. Braucher, supra note 36, at 700 (emphasis added).
258. See Radin, supra note 37, at 531–33.
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must explicitly consent to each and every clause.”259 A key insight
from contract law is that the parties’ relationship may be governed in
part by terms that are the product of hypothetical bargains, terms to
which they did not in fact agree,260 but only if the parameters of the
agreement are sufficiently certain.261 Otherwise, a court would go too
far in “imposing its own conception of what the parties should or
might have undertaken, rather than confining itself to the
implementation of a bargain to which [the parties] have mutually
committed themselves.”262 Under black letter law, terms are certain
when “they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach
and for giving an appropriate remedy.”263
This certainty requirement as to the key terms authorizes legal
intervention within a realm circumscribed by the parties’ preferences.
Courts tend to analyze certainty in several different ways. They can
look to whether the agreement specifies the key terms.264 Terms that
define a product or performance, allocate responsibilities between the
parties, or specify a date for performance may be deemed essential.265
Relatedly, courts ask whether the existing terms of the agreement
provide a basis for determining whether a breach has occurred and, if
so, what the remedy will be.266 The focus of this inquiry is whether, in
light of the broader goals of the parties, the parties have sufficiently
manifested their intentions so that a court would have certainty about
the parameters of those goals. Courts also analyze certainty by
looking to see whether the parties have left open terms for future

259. See id. at 508 n.2; see also Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving
Contracts (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(“Mutual assent has never required a complete understanding of – and assent to – every
specific term in a contract by every party to a contract.”).
260. See Bix, supra note 191, at 261; Joo, supra note 26, at 163.
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
262. Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (N.Y.
1981).
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2).
264. See § 33 cmt. a (“If the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for
deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract.”); § 33 cmt.
f (“The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the indication is that the parties do
not intend to be bound.”).
265. See, e.g., Acad. Chi. Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (Ill. 1991)
(concluding that a publication agreement for an anthology of short stories that did not
describe the length and content of the proposed book, did not identify who would decide
whether stories would be included, and did not specify a date for delivery of the
manuscript, was missing key terms).
266. See id. (“Without setting forth adequate terms for compliance, the publishing
agreement provides no basis for determining when breach has occurred.”).
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agreement.267 Agreements to agree are classic examples of indefinite
agreements: language indicating the necessity of future negotiations
or contemplating the existence of future agreements are not
enforceable.268 Once a court is convinced that the key terms are
sufficiently certain, the court may infer missing terms based on past
dealings, custom, or other objective methods of determination.269
The second doctrinal innovation is the acceptance of an objective
theory of assent. The implementation of the objective theory provides
a useful guide for balancing the need to honor subjective preferences
with the function of objective authorization. Courts will look to the
objectively manifested actions of the parties, rather than their internal
preferences, to determine to what commitments the parties
assented.270 But contract law has not moved to complete objectivity: it
still protects individual will by ensuring that contracting parties have a
minimal level of mental capacity (i.e., making agreements by the
insane voidable271); that a party’s beliefs regarding a basic assumption
on which the contract is made are in accord with the facts272; and that
the commitment is not the product of undue influence or duress.273 It
also honors the shared subjective intent of the parties regarding the
meaning of a contract term even if it departs from the objective
meaning.274 These limits on the objective view of consent ensure a

267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. c (“The more terms the
parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding
agreement.”).
268. See, e.g., 2004 McDonald Ave. Realty, LLC v. 2004 McDonald Ave. Corp., 858
N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that a letter agreement that expressly
said it was “not a binding agreement” with the exception of three provisions and
contemplating the execution of a future lease agreement was not enforceable). But see
U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978) (allowing courts to supply
an open price term in certain circumstances).
269. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Scheider, 360 N.E.2d 930, 931 (N.Y. 1976)
(holding that the failure of an actor and studio to agree on a start date for the filming of a
television series would not preclude the court from finding a binding agreement based on
industry custom).
270. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d. 516, 521 (Va. Ct. App. 1954); Barnett, supra note
199, at 303.
271. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15; Joseph M. Perillo, The
Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427, 464 (2000).
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151–54.
273. See id. §§ 174–77; Perillo, supra note 271, at 471. The justification for these
doctrines has shifted between “the interior of the mind of the promisor” (subjective) and
“abuses of the bargaining process” (objective), but the doctrinal tests still look to the
parties’ will and beliefs. Perillo, supra note 271, at 470–74.
274. See Barnett, supra note 199, at 652.
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suitable relationship between will and conduct, while recognizing
that, in some situations, the two will diverge.
These tools provide a convenient jumping-off point to examine
the ideal relationship between individual will and legal authorization
within the context of informal relationships. Like contract, intimate
relationships involve two or more individuals with distinct autonomy
interests.275 Because many goals of a relationship cannot be achieved
unilaterally, the relevant act of will must enlist the other. To
accomplish this, just as in contract law, the act of will must be
objectively manifested.
Moreover, given the innumerable interactions that characterize
intimate relationships, many of which could be understood to involve
some sort of exchange or the performance of obligations based on illdefined standards, the law cannot require that every possible
contingency be the product of a fully informed decision before
authorizing legal intervention. Like contract law, authorization should
flow from objectively manifested consent to key commitments. To the
extent that subsidiary legal consequences flow from those
commitments, hypothetical authorization is sufficient. As in the
contract context, courts should be sensitive to the possibility that the
partners might consent to separate and severable commitments.
Within the context of adult intimate relationships, consent, in short,
should be objective acts sufficient to authorize or waive an objection
to the imposition of particular rights or obligations that relate to those
acts.
This approach elevates the partners’ conduct over their privately
held intentions. It therefore invites the possibility that a partner could
“trap” himself by doing or saying something that would lead to the
imposition of obligations against his will. These risks are justified in
part by the need to protect the reliance interests of the partners.276
For example, if one partner says something that would reasonably
induce the other partner to take action detrimental to his selfinterest—e.g., “Why don’t you just take that lower paying job so that
we have more time to go on vacation; I can cover the rent”—the
state’s interest in protecting reliance interests might necessitate
disregarding the subjective will of the one making the statement. But,
as in the contract context, doctrines such as duress or mutual mistake

275. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2026.
276. Cf. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936) (explaining the concept of “reliance interest” in
terms of a contractual relationship).
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provide additional assurance that the conduct was the product of
will.277 They ensure that will does not stray too far from conduct.
B.

Determining the Scope of Obligation

The preceding discussion established that consent justifies the
imposition of obligations when a person objectively manifests the will
to be bound to the key terms of a commitment or obligation. To
argue that the law should impose obligations only after a person
objectively consents to the key aspects of those obligations begs the
question of how to identify the terms to which the parties have
consented. I propose a different way of looking at the objects of
consent in the nonmarital context. The aggregation of benefits in a
single status has thwarted attempts to measure “fit” between conduct
and functional categories. Rather than asking whether the partners
have willed a marriage-like relationship, we should disaggregate the
package of rights and obligations bound up in the status of marriage
to determine the parties’ commitments. This argument gathers
strength from two premises. First, marriage performs a variety of
functions, not all of which necessarily rise and fall together. Second,
elsewhere in the law, identical parties often engage in separate
transactions, which have separate aims and require separate consents,
and tools exist to determine whether they should rise and fall
together.
The rights and obligations of marriage are ripe for
disaggregation. Recall the reasons the law might seek to impose legal
obligations on people in informal relationships. One party might ask a
court to recognize the partner’s inter se obligations: his respective
claims to property or support from the other.278 Or he may seek some
benefit typically reserved for married people, like the right to visit his
partner in the hospital or to make medical decisions on his behalf. Or,
the state may seek to hold him responsible when his partner applies
for disability coverage or treat the partners the same as they would a
married couple for the purpose of calculating their income tax.
Marriage groups these rights and obligations in a single package.
All of these commitments are accessed by one act, the choice to

277. These doctrines could be strengthened to provide greater protection if need be.
For example, a doctrine akin to procedural or substantive unconscionability could raise
the baseline for the commitments that would be reasonable for a person to make or the
conditions under which the commitments were made.
278. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
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marry.279 Although the default rule is that spouses share the income
and property they accumulate during the marriage, they can alter
most of their inter se obligations by agreement.280 But most of the
spouses’ rights as against third parties or the state are beyond their
power to contract: spouses cannot elect to file income tax returns as
single281; they cannot avoid liabilities incurred by the other spouse for
the benefit of the marriage.282 As the Supreme Court observed in
Obergefell v. Hodges,283 marriage is “the basis for an expanding list of
governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.”284
No one believes that spouses understand on a granular level the
full package of rights and obligations that accompany marriage when
they marry.285 Yet the formal choice to marry has historically justified
the imposition of those rights and obligations.286 Although divorcing
279. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2033–35. Professor Gregg Strauss has
demonstrated that social norms around marriage serve other functions beyond providing
notice, namely that they enforce open-ended or “imperfect” duties during ongoing
relationships. See Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial
Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1310 (2015).
280. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital
and Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 318–19 (2012) (noting that all American
jurisdictions will enforce premarital agreements concerning economic consequences but
that procedural and substantive requirements may differ); Sean Hannon Williams,
Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 832–38 (describing the legal treatment of
agreements between spouses). But see Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern
Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 85 (1994) (noting the substantial limitations on
disinheriting spouses).
281. See 26 U.S.C. § 7703 (2012); Argyle v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 397 F. App’x
823, 824 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a married person who is neither divorced nor under a
decree of separate maintenance is not entitled to single-filing status).
282. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 910 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 10 of 2018 Reg.
Sess.).
283. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
284. Id. at 2601. A quick glance at the Court’s list of marital rights and obligations
reveals some that can be altered—such as medical decision-making authority—and others
that cannot be—like professional ethics rules or workers’ compensation eligibility. See id.
285. See Polikoff, supra note 213, at 370–72 (asserting that the dramatic variations in
state laws establishing obligations between spouses means couples generally remain
unaware of the specific legal obligations attendant to marriage); see also Lynn A. Baker &
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440–41,
445 (1993) (finding that marriage-license applicants surveyed had “largely incorrect
perceptions of the legal terms of the marriage contract as embodied in divorce statutes.”).
Even if it were possible for people to know all of the legal rights accompanying marriage,
the laws might change or the couple might move to a different state.
286. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE 103 (2010) (“In entering into a
marriage, participants indicate their assent to a specific formal status that comes with a set
of enforceable legal rights and responsibilities.”); Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 93–
95 (noting that the institutionalized expectations of marriage are well understood and
deliberately chosen by those who marry). Of course, there is always room for
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spouses may fight intensely about the consequences of those
obligations, they rarely question their legitimacy.287 That is because
the act of entering marriage—most commonly accomplished through
the execution of formalities like the performance of a marriage
ceremony and signing of a marriage license—invokes a powerful set
of social norms that substitute for the myriad legal details.288
The social norms around the institution of marriage minimize
concerns about whether the act of choosing to marry reflects the
subjective desires of the spouses to perform the basic duties of
marriage, aligning the value of will with the function of authorization.
As Elizabeth Scott has observed, marriage is accompanied by
commitment norms that define marriage as a “lasting, cooperative,
[and] intimate relationship,” with obligations running to spouses and
children.289 Much like in the contracts context, agreement to the “key
terms” of marriage justifies the imposition of detailed rules governing
property ownership, duties of support, and the various rules that will
govern if the spouses divorce.290
In contrast, nonmarriage lacks norms that align behavior and
law.291 Therefore, it is nearly impossible to point to one act as
justifying the imposition of the panoply of legal obligations that
accompany marriage. With apologies to Leo Tolstoy, marriages are

improvement. Professor Teri Dobbins Baxter has argued that states must do more to
make marrying couples aware of the property rights that will govern their relationship and
provide couples the opportunity to change those rights at the point they sign their
marriage license. See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Marriage on Our Own Terms, 41 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 38 (2017).
287. The small number of cases in which spouses raise fraudulent inducement claims,
as compared to the number of divorce cases within the same jurisdiction, supports this
argument. A quick search in January 2018 of West’s Key Number Digest reveals sixty-nine
California headnotes raising fraud as grounds for annulment (West Key Number 253,
k321). In comparison, there were 4,998 California headnotes regarding community
property obligations (West Key Number 253V, k751–k1070).
288. See Matsumura, supra note 10, at 2048, 2051; see also Carbone & Cahn, supra note
21, at 93–95.
289. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1901, 1907–12 (2000); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 44, at 1251 (observing
“the relative harmony between [spouses’] preferences and the societal norms and legal
default rules that form the common understandings about marital behavior”); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government out of Marriage” Post Obergefell: The IllConsidered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1445, 1476–77 (asserting that doing away with civil marriage would risk
disrupting the positive norms that marriage has retained post-Obergefell).
290. This is not to say that marital behavior necessarily conforms to these norms. See
Case, supra note 173, at 1765.
291. See supra Part I (describing the tremendous variation in how nonmarital
relationships are structured).
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(theoretically) all alike; every nonmarriage is nonmarital in its own
way.292
Moreover, although the choice to marry suffices as consent to the
various rights and obligations of marriage, the bundling of those
rights and obligations is not necessarily optimal. Scholars have
pointed out that marriage is bursting at the seams.293 For example,
Kerry Abrams has demonstrated that the use of marriage to award
various public benefits has resulted in concerns that people will use
marriage instrumentally, which has in turn promoted the proliferation
of doctrines to detect marriage fraud.294 If, in light of social trends and
legal developments like no-fault divorce, marriage is no longer
permanent, then it will raise the possibility of fraud and not always be
the best vehicle for awarding benefits based on support or
dependency.295 Additionally, many of the laws that classify on the
basis of marriage promote family structures based on gender norms
that some may find offensive and that, at any rate, no longer describe
the way that a majority of households operate.296 Thus, regardless of
292. See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds.,
Constance Garnett trans., Modern Library 2000) (1877) (“Happy families are all alike;
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”).
293. See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (“Simply put,
we are asking marriage to do too much.”); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social
Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 323–24 (2004) (challenging the perception of
marriage as a “benevolent monolith” and proposing to disaggregate its functions); cf.
James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2003)
(predicting that “family law is moving from a conception of marriage as an institution with
a uniform meaning to a more variegated view that assesses marriage in terms of discrete
groupings, or ‘bundles,’ of rights and responsibilities”).
294. Abrams, supra note 293, passim.
295. See id. at 54–57.
296. See id. at 58–60. Consent historically operated to justify the imposition of all the
legal rules comprising the marital status. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11 (2002) (“The man and woman consented to marry,
but public authorities set the terms of the marriage. . . . Once the union was formed, its
obligations were fixed in common law.”). These legal rules systematically disadvantaged
wives. See id. at 11–12. Rules like the marital rape exception, which made husbands legally
exempt from raping their wives, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Consent and Contest: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000), were justified by the
consensual nature of marriage. See id. at 1386–87. That is, the wife’s consent to sex was
“conclusively inferred . . . from the couple’s initial agreement to marry.” Id. at 1387. Even
setting aside the substantive unfairness of these rules, this example illustrates the dangers
of inferring broad consent to every legal incident of marriage from the choice to marry.
Where the rights of marriage exist at cross-purposes, there is a danger of offering marriage
as a take-it-or-leave-it whole. Moreover, as scholars have observed in other contexts, there
are likely cognitive limits on the amount of information to which one can consent in a
single act. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (exploring the limited capacity of
persons to process information); see, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
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whether one would prefer to unbundle marriage or to leave it
untouched, there are good reasons to analyze the functions separately
outside of marriage.
Unmarried partners may make commitments piecemeal rather
than wholesale. It seems unlikely based on the way most relationships
unfold that people contemplate their commitments as a single, takeit-or-leave-it whole. Commitments are often incremental—e.g.,
deciding first to split the rent rather than agreeing to divide all
property during the relationship as if married297—and unfold over
time. Further, the commitments may cover distinct types of
performances regarding, for example, childcare, domestic duties, or
finances that the partners understand to be separate, and that can be
completed independently of each other. Scholars studying lower
income cohabiting couples report that unmarried couples with
children will often live together for the benefit of their child and at
the same time eschew financial entanglements.298 These living
situations demonstrate that childrearing and finances are not
inherently linked: one can consent to one set of obligations without
necessarily consenting to the other.
There are costs and benefits to treating a complex transaction as
a series of separate agreements or one entire agreement. In some
cases, the various commitments are part of a package deal to which
the parties arguably would not have agreed if separate.299 But
recognizing separate agreements allows the parties to receive the
benefit of bargains regarding completed performances even if some

Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687 (2011) (discussing
information overload within the context of consumer disclosure requirements); Karen
Bradshaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 762 (2015) (analyzing the
effects of information overload on consumer decision making). Whatever lessons these
arguments provide when considering consent to marital obligations, they only strengthen
the proposal to disaggregate the rights and obligations when determining consent to
nonmarital regulation.
297. The latter sharing arrangement was the alleged agreement in Marvin v. Marvin,
557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
298. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 96–97; see also EDIN & KEFALAS, supra
note 97, at 106–09 (describing a couple jointly raising a child while avoiding financial
commitments).
299. See, e.g., Rudman v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 280 N.E.2d 867, 873 (N.Y. 1972)
(involving the attempt by the seller of a small business to a larger company to rescind the
sale based on the breach of his employment agreement by that company). Leases were
once treated as independent covenants, such that if the tenant failed to pay rent, the
landlord could sue for the unpaid amounts yet would not be excused from providing
possession. Those covenants are now treated as interdependent. See Henry E. Smith,
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1189
(2006).
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aspects of the transaction fall through. Particularly in complex
relationships, a modular approach—in which a complex system is
broken down into pieces that perform separate functions relatively
independently300—provides several benefits. As Henry Smith has
pointed out, “modularity allows a system to manage uncertainty;
because each module can function and develop in relative isolation,
these processes can occur without the need to resolve uncertainty
elsewhere in the system.”301 The human mind is better able to grasp a
complex phenomenon when the phenomenon is modular.302
Modularity provides a useful metaphor for informal
relationships. Informal relationships are complex because they serve
varied functions, involve a range of conduct, and depend on the
subjective and changing views of at least two individuals, each with
their own interests. At any given moment, the partners may disagree
about the significance or “meaning” of their relationship, and the law
might likewise struggle to categorize it. Modules, like financial
arrangements or childcare schedules, are easier to identify. They
reduce information and negotiation costs by allowing partners to
identify and discuss discrete functions without having to reassess the
entire relationship.303
Once we entertain the possibility of disaggregation, the challenge
then becomes correctly determining whether the different
commitments should rise and fall together or whether they can be
teased apart. Again, contract doctrine provides some useful tools to
answer that question.
It is common for parties to enter multiple separate agreements
rather than a single, compound transaction. A manufacturer like
Foxconn may enter into an agreement with a seller like Apple to
provide different models of iPhones and iPads over the course of
many years, each product with its own prices and specifications.304 In a
merger or acquisition, the buyer and target will execute an acquisition
300. Smith, supra note 299, at 1176 (“[M]odularity is a device to deal with complexity
by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), in which communications (or
other interdependencies) are intense within the module but sparse and standardized
across modules.”).
301. Id. at 1177.
302. See id. at 1179.
303. The effect of modularization on reducing information costs and streamlining
negotiation has been amply explored in the contract literature. See, e.g., Joshua Fairfield,
The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J.
1401, 1176–77 (2009); Smith, supra note 299, at 1177.
304. See, e.g., David Barboza, How China Built ‘iPhone City’ with Billions in Perks for
Apple’s Partner, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29
/technology/apple-iphone-china-foxconn.html [https://perma.cc/S2VG-CMF6 (dark archive)].
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agreement—for instance an asset purchase agreement, stock purchase
agreement, or merger agreement—but may also execute a variety of
stand-alone agreements covering, for instance, confidentiality, the
transfer of intellectual property, or the future employment of key
individuals.305 A professor with an annual contract may accept
additional compensation from her home institution to create and
teach an online course.306
Courts have come up with tests to determine whether
commitments form part of the same agreement such that they rise or
fall together. Whether the agreement is entire or separate turns
“primarily on the intention of the parties, the subject matter of the
agreement, and the conduct of the parties.”307 The touchstone of the
inquiry is whether the parties intended a single assent to an entire
transaction, or a separate assent to each of several things.308 In
answering that question, courts have examined the overlap between
the “nature and purpose” of the agreements; whether each agreement
is supported by separate consideration; and whether the obligations
triggered by the agreements will be discharged by the same or
different occurrences.309 Applying this test, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a provision in which a
seller agreed to transfer real property to a buyer for a specified price,
and a provision in which the seller agreed to pay the broker a
commission, were two separate agreements even though set forth in a
single document.310 One agreement was for the sale of real property;
the other was for an employment contract.311 The two provisions
rested on different consideration: the exchange of money for property
305. See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1411–16 (2016).
306. See, e.g., RUTGERS UNIV., DRAFT LETTER AGREEMENT FOR ONLINE COURSE
WITH
FULL-TIME
FACULTY
(2012),
http://senate.rutgers.edu
/OnlineCourseAgreementLetterDraftRePearson.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQP2-ADNR].
307. Stanley Works v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 816, 827 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2012).
308. See id.; see also Rudman v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 280 N.E.2d 867, 873 (N.Y.
1972). In cases involving written agreements, the form of the agreements—whether
memorialized in a single or different documents—can serve as evidence of intent, see
Schron v. Grunstein, 917 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), although courts have
concluded that a single written document actually contained multiple separate
agreements, see, e.g., In re Gardinier, Inc., 831 F.2d 974, 976 (11th Cir. 1987).
309. In re Gardinier, 831 F.2d at 976; see also Wood v. Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke
Cty., 818 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell, 116
S.E.2d 63, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961)) (noting that under Georgia law, a contract is separate if
“the quantity, service, or thing is to be accepted by separate performances”).
310. See In re Gardinier, 831 F.2d at 976.
311. Id.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018)

2018]

CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION

1071

in one case, and different money for services in the second.312 These
types of inquiries could easily be adapted to the intimate context.
Agreements about childcare responsibilities would be presumptively
distinct from decisions Fabout the pooling of assets unless the facts
suggested that the partners saw those decisions as related, for
example, if one partner reduced his work responsibilities and shortly
thereafter began to perform a greater share of childcare.
Disaggregation questions the relatedness of different obligations,
but it does not presuppose that the parties intended commitments to
be separate. In Hewitt v. Hewitt,313 for example, a woman lived with a
man for fifteen years in a marriage-like relationship, raising the
couple’s three children and devoting her efforts to enhancing his
professional standing in reliance on his promise to share his earnings
and property with her.314 Under her version of events, her decision to
support the couple’s children was part of an arrangement that
included the pooling of income and property.315 She would not have
entered the relationship at the outset without all of these functions
being linked. A court could consider that evidence in determining the
scope of legal obligations to which the parties consented through their
conduct.
In sum, when seeking to impose legal obligations on people in
nonmarital relationships, the law can and should see those obligations
as something less than a marriage-like whole. With those obligations
more precisely identified, courts can inquire whether the parties
objectively manifested their desire to perform the key aspects of
those obligations.
IV. APPLYING THE CONSENT FRAMEWORK
Consent—in particular, the two-pronged approach set forth in
the previous Part—offers a superior justificatory rationale for
regulating intimate relationships. This Part demonstrates how consent
theory can both improve the assignment of inter se obligations and
ground the extension of state-provided rights and obligations based
on characteristics of the relationship.

312. Id.
313. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
314. Id. at 1205.
315. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately held that the woman failed to state a
claim for relief because of a public policy against the recognition of contracts between
cohabitants. Id. at 1211. This rule, which is at odds with the approach of a majority of
states, was recently affirmed in Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 849–60 (Ill. 2016).
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A. Reforming Current Approaches
The most immediate payoff of orienting regulation around
consent is in reforming existing approaches to the resolution of inter
se disputes between partners or their estates at the end of the
relationship. These claims arise when partners have joined their lives
in certain respects and seek the law’s assistance to help disentangle
their respective rights. Because this context often requires the law to
impose legal obligations over the parties’ disagreement, consent is
critical.
Returning to a hypothetical from the Introduction of the Article,
recall Anna and Ben, who have lived together for approximately a
decade and who have six-figure salaries each (although Anna’s is
higher). Assume that the couple also jointly purchased a home,
contributing slightly different amounts to the down payment but
paying the mortgage equally. Regarding that home purchase, Anna
spent more time reviewing legal documents while Ben spent more
time updating and maintaining the property. Now imagine that Anna
and Ben break up.
Under an implied contract approach, the scope of relief would
depend on the promises alleged by the parties.316 Ben, as the lower
earning partner, might bring a variety of claims. He could seek
equitable division of the couple’s income during the course of the
relationship under the theory that the couple agreed that they would
own everything fifty-fifty. He could instead assert a claim for an equal
division of the couple’s shared real property. Or he could claim he is
owed remuneration for his nonfinancial contributions.
The first, and broadest, claim is similar to the one brought in
Marvin and has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.317 Ben could
argue that the fact that he covered the couple’s living expenses when
Anna was in law school evinces the couple’s intent to create maritallike property rights, but their tendency to keep their finances separate
would weigh against that evidence. The second claim for equal
division of the property might be belied by their unequal
contributions. And although courts increasingly rely on the doctrine
of unjust enrichment to reimburse partners’ financial contributions,318
316. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 n.16 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (noting that the
difference between an express and implied contract is the absence of “direct words of the
parties” and a focus instead on “acts and conduct” under the circumstances).
317. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 30.
318. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 64–68 (providing an overview of cases
examining the theory of unjust enrichment in the context of unmarried couples); Candace
Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Cohabitation and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
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courts struggle to value nonfinancial contributions and usually reject
or discount them.319 Regarding the third claim, the unjust enrichment
remedy would quantify and reimburse their respective financial
contributions but might not reach much further.
The model of consent advanced in this Article suggests
refinements to the implied contract approach. First, except in
exceptional circumstances, parties should avoid bringing broad claims
about intending to create quasi-marriages. The consent lens explains
why claims analogizing to marriage are less likely to prevail than the
ones alleging concrete exchanges supported by the facts.320
Disaggregated claims would make courts more comfortable about
granting relief and would help to develop a body of case law
regarding the types of conduct typically giving rise to more limited
obligations. Second, and relatedly, courts should be more receptive to
arguments alleging these discrete legal consequences. In the absence
of express promises, the critical inquiry should be whether the facts
suggest that the parties consented to that legal consequence; this
represents a shift of focus from a futile inquiry into subjective intent
to whether the state action is justified. For example, although it would
be difficult to prove agreement by Anna and Ben to own their real
property fifty-fifty given their unequal financial contributions, a court
should be able to consider whether the circumstances indicate consent
by Anna to an equal division of the property based on Ben’s
nonfinancial contributions. Statements through the years about the
equality of their contributions, or suggesting the partners understood
that Ben was making an in-kind contribution, could suffice as proof.
Focusing on consent also suggests reforms for jurisdictions
pursuing status approaches. Under the current status approaches, a
court will analogize the relationship to marriage, either by looking at
factors that suggest a marriage-like relationship321 or by presuming
Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1419 (2011) (asserting that “many cases
decided in the later part of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first
century have allowed one cohabitant from a terminated relationship to recover from the
other” under an unjust enrichment theory).
319. See Antognini, supra note 20, at 43–46 (concluding that courts often consider
nonfinancial contributions in nonmarital relationships as “less valuable than financial
contributions”).
320. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 21, at 67 (explaining that “states continue to vary
in their willingness to address claims arising from nonmarital cohabitation,” but suggesting
that courts are showing a greater willingness to untangle ownership of assets of
nonmarried couples).
321. Under the Washington meretricious relationship line of cases, the court assesses
whether the relationship was “marital-like” based on “continuous cohabitation, duration
of the relationship, purpose of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint
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that their lengthy cohabitation means they are domestic partners.322
Depending on whether their relationship is sufficiently marriage-like,
either all the income and property acquired during their relationship,
as well as their liabilities, will be subject to equitable distribution, or
none of it will. A presumption based on cohabitation would likely
favor equitable distribution in this context: the law would divide
Anna’s surplus earnings with Ben and might even subject her to
obligations of support.323
The lens of consent reveals the shortcomings of the status
approach. The parties’ acts make it unlikely that Anna intended to
divide her earnings over the course of the relationship, and especially
unlikely that she foresaw the relationship giving rise to an ongoing
duty of support. A status modeled on marriage, though, provides two
options: recognize these rights in full or not at all. Neither outcome
aligns with the ways that Anna and Ben lived their lives. The legal
consequences stray too far from the parties’ subjective preferences,
threatening their autonomy. Applying the principles of consent
articulated in the previous Part, states interested in pursuing a status
approach must recognize the existence of disaggregated rights and
obligations. This weighs in favor of providing a plurality of statuses or
a range of legal consequences stemming from a determination that an
informal partnership exists to address the diversity of nonmarital
relationships.324
The correctness of this solution becomes more obvious when
thinking about another hypothetical couple from the Introduction,

projects, and the intent of the parties.” Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash.
1995) (en banc) (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984) (en
banc)); see, e.g., Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wash. 1976) (en banc); In re
Marriage of DeHollander, 770 P.2d 638, 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). If the relationship is
“marital-like,” the court will identify the property acquired during the relationship and
make an equitable division. Connell, 898 P.2d at 835–36.
322. Under the ALI approach, Anna and Ben’s lengthy cohabitation would trigger a
presumption that the couple shared a life together. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(3) (AM. LAW INST.
2002). If the party contesting the relationship failed to rebut the presumption, the same
rules governing division of marital property would apply, see § 6.05, and Ben, as the lower
earning partner, would potentially be entitled to compensatory payments (spousal
support), see § 6.06.
323. See § 5.04 (providing for compensatory payments for the loss of “marital” living
standard depending on the income discrepancy and duration of the relationship).
324. Clare Chambers has come to a similar conclusion, although she has not focused
much attention on how the state would identify to couples for whom the statuses would
apply—under my analysis, consent would provide the answer. See Clare Chambers, The
Limitations of Contract, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS
51, 74–77 (Elizabeth Brake ed., 2016).
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Camille and David. Because they live under the same roof and share
a child, Camille and David would almost certainly be treated under
the ALI Principles as domestic partners, meaning they would be
subject to marital property rules upon the breakdown of their
relationship.325 Yet Camille, like the working-class individuals on
whom her character is based,326 likely took steps to avoid financial
entanglements because she did not want to entwine her fate with
David’s. She may have kept the lease in her name and her earnings in
a separate checking account. Moreover, although David contributed
some money to buy things for their child and may even have
purchased things for the household from time to time, Camille did not
come to personally depend on his financial contributions. To subject
them to a monolithic status that would redistribute the couple’s
property would likely contravene their wishes and expose parties like
Camille to disabling legal consequences. That said, their conduct
could justify the creation of co-parenting obligations.327 Consent
explains why the law could recognize the relationship for some
purposes but not others.328
B.

Recognizing Rights and Obligations from the State

Although the bulk of judicial attention has focused on the
resolution of inter se disputes, marriage comes with rights and
obligations designed to nourish the relationship, support the family,
and advance other objectives like privatizing dependency.329 Unlike in
the inter se context, nonmarital partners may actually agree about the
nature of their relationship—i.e., that it involves commitment,
intimacy, or mutual support. But with rare exceptions, states currently
award these rights based on formal status, granting rights to those

325. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03(2) (declaring persons domestic partners when they have
maintained a common household with their common child for a continuous period of time
set by state rule).
326. See supra text accompanying note 97; see supra Section I.A.3.
327. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 225–31 (2015) (proposing broader coparenting rights for nonmarital parents).
328. June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have criticized the tendency of the law to treat
nonmarital couples inconsistently with regard to parental and property rights. See Carbone
& Cahn, supra note 21, at 58–59 (advocating for a “unified approach” to both parental and
property rights in the nonmarriage context). This Article’s focus on consent could explain
and justify those inconsistent outcomes.
329. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 153, 176–77 (2015); Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private
Family Support, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (2014).
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who have married or have registered for alternate statuses, like
domestic partnerships, and withholding rights from those who have
not.330 Courts have upheld the state’s prerogative to associate certain
rights and benefits with marriage without having to offer those rights
to people in informal relationships.331
There are justifications for this differential treatment beyond the
promotion of marriage or disapproval of nonmarital relationships.332
A state might worry about partners fraudulently claiming benefits and
then denying obligations when it suits them.333 Adjudicating eligibility
would also impose burdens on the courts or government agencies.334
These concerns are serious and deserve deep treatment beyond the
scope this Article provides. But both point to a more fundamental
problem to which consent is relevant: What are the criteria for
awarding the rights and obligations, and how can we tell if they have
been satisfied? Put another way, how do we identify those partners to
whom rights should flow?
Scholars advocating for the extension of rights such as workers’
compensation, Social Security, inheritance, and favorable tax
treatment to partners in informal relationships have not satisfactorily

330. See, e.g., Holguin v. Flores, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 749, 756, 758–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(upholding the denial of standing to sue for wrongful death because the plaintiff was not
married and reasoning that the state had adequate reasons to distinguish between married
and unmarried people).
331. See id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081,
2083–84 (2005) (arguing that the right to marriage is merely a right of access to whatever
panoply of benefits a state decides to associate with the status). But see Joslin, supra note
21, at 481–87 (arguing that the denial of certain rights, like some ability to create shared
interests in property, could violate a right to nonmarriage).
332. For examples of these traditional justifications, see Charron v. Amaral, 889
N.E.2d 946, 949 (Mass. 2008) (quoting Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095,
1096 (Mass. 1987)); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988); Blumberg, supra note
29, at 1144–46 (claiming that the marital requirement in the Social Security context was
motivated by moral considerations). Numerous scholars have questioned whether
developments in the law have undercut these morality-based arguments.
333. See Abrams, supra note 293, at 6 (“In short, because marriage became easier to
get in and out of, and because there were more benefits attached to it, people had greater
incentives to use it instrumentally.”); see also PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1281 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
334. See Elden, 758 P.2d at 587 (refusing to extend standing to sue for loss of
consortium to cohabitants in part because “[i]t would require a court to inquire into the
relationship of the partners”). Some scholars who advocate for the expansion of rights to
people in informal relationships do not expect the burden to be too overwhelming. See,
e.g., Bowman, supra note 105, at 32, 32 n.118. The existence of a burden on the courts does
not make the burden unwarranted or illegitimate; it burdens the courts to perform
factfinding in run-of-the-mill breach of contract actions, but such actions are still
permitted.
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answered these questions.335 To the extent that they propose entry
requirements for these various rights at all, these scholars tend to
settle on cohabitation for a predetermined time period.336 The
problem is that cohabitation is a muddy indicator of the partners’
subjective views about the relationship, as discussed above.337 The
usefulness of cohabitation further decreases if duration matters:
people may gradually consolidate two separate living situations,
making it unclear when they begin sharing the same household.338 The
reliance on cohabitation stems from the rejection of consent. But that
rejection has led away from productive answers to the questions
posed in the previous paragraph. To wit: in the most detailed extant
analysis of the relationship between objective conduct and stateprovided benefits like Social Security, Grace Blumberg has argued
that the purpose of those benefits is to “ensure that certain persons
likely to have been dependent on the worker are supported by an
earmarked fund.”339 But rather than looking to signs of dependency
or economic integration, Blumberg has proposed that the government
look to cohabitation340 which, as discussed in Part I.A, could be
accompanied by very little financial dependency.
By requiring the state to articulate a relationship between
conduct and different state-provided benefits that the state seeks to
target, consent provides an improved framework for solving the

335. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 21, at 146–207 (arguing to extend to nontraditional
couples rights relating to health insurance, medical decision making, hospital visitation,
protected medical leave, Social Security, workers’ compensation—and, upon death or
dissolution—financial and custody rights); Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1137–59. Allowing
people to formally opt into statuses that provide these rights would be a straightforward
solution. See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Nonmarital Relationship Statuses in
the Same-Sex Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 45, 64–70 (2014) (proposing the
creation of official nonmarital statuses at the state level for which couples could sign up).
The problem is that the solution would not reach many, if not most, people in informal
relationships. See Bowman, supra note 105, at 32.
336. See supra note 42.
337. See supra Section I.A. As a case in point, Professor Bowman has recently
proposed extending certain rights to people in LAT relationships because of the essential
qualities of many of those relationships. See Bowman, supra note 105, at 33. But her
proposal has not spelled out how the state actors who administer those rights would
identify which LAT couples qualify. See id.
338. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 21, at 240 (proposing that courts should consider
the duration of a cohabiting relationship but failing to set forth a specific timeframe for
when a couple becomes de-facto-married).
339. Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1147.
340. Id. at 1148 (“I recommend, therefore, that an unmarried co-habitant who can
demonstrate that she shares or shared a common household with an insured worker be
entitled to Social Security derivative benefits as though she were a current, former, or
surviving spouse of the insured worker.”).
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identification problem. The remainder of this Section sketches a
vision of how consent can ground the extension of rights to people in
informal relationships, focusing in particular on the challenges of
identification and norm development. Determining whether a person
has consented to a legal obligation involves determining the scope of
the obligation and the relevant justificatory act.
Laws that classify based on relationship status should be based
upon rational distinctions between single individuals and people in
relationships.341 In other words, there should be some articulable
reason or justification for the classification, whether it involves
providing Social Security survivor benefits or the joint filing of an
income tax return. To be sure, lawmakers seldom articulate official
justifications for their classifications, and, even when they do, those
justifications may be so broad that they are of limited use.342 But the
law does not speak clearly about the reasons it classifies based on
marriage because it has rarely been called on to do so. Moreover,
when necessary, scholars and courts have demonstrated that it is
possible to analyze statutory schemes and identify the motivating
considerations.343 For example, the federal government will consider
informal relationships when determining eligibility for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits.344 The Social Security
Administration will treat a couple as married if they “live together in
the same household” and “lead people to believe that [they] are
husband and wife.”345 Courts have found that the SSI regulation is
rooted in the assumption that two people living together in a maritallike relationship will provide financial support to the other: that they
will pool their finances.346 Workers’ compensation insurance makes
341. See Krause, supra note 43, at 276, 278 (arguing that under a “pragmatic, rational
approach,” the law should “ask what social functions of a particular association justify
extending what social benefits and privileges,” such that “[m]arried and unmarried couples
who are in the same factual positions [would] be treated alike.”).
342. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2012) (stating that one purpose of the Family &
Medical Leave Act is “to promote the stability and economic security of families”).
343. See generally Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1126 (examining laws governing
“benefits and rights that normally accrue as incidents of marriage”); Stephen D.
Sugarman, What Is a “Family”? Conflicting Messages from our Public Programs, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 231 (2008) (analyzing various government programs like food stamps and public
housing and identifying the purposes of treating individuals as part of a recognized family
unit).
344. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1291–94 (explaining that “parties do not have to be
legally married to be considered spouses for the purposes of SSI eligibility—they only
need to hold themselves out as a married couple”).
345. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1806(a)(3) (2017).
346. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld lower benefits for cohabitant
applicants because “two people living together can live more economically than they
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employers responsible for workers’ actual dependents—those who
receive significant financial support from the insured or are
financially interdependent.347 These characteristics (e.g., pooling
finances or providing financial support) should set the parameters of
the legal treatment at issue; they should define the legal obligation.
Although people in nonmarital relationships often fail (or choose
not) to formalize their relationships, they frequently perform acts that
the state could deem relevant to the legal obligations just described.
Sometimes, they identify themselves by affirmatively seeking a
benefit. Arizona, for example, once allowed state employees to claim
health insurance benefits for a nonmarital partner with whom the
employee had cohabited for at least a year and created financial
interdependency.348 To obtain coverage, the employee had to submit a
“Qualified Domestic Partner Affidavit” including three of the
following forms of proof:
i. Having a joint mortgage, joint property tax identification, or
joint tenancy on a residential lease;
ii. Holding one or more credit or bank accounts jointly, such as
a checking account, in both names;
iii. Assuming joint liabilities;
iv. Having joint ownership of significant property, such as real
estate, a vehicle, or a boat;
v. Naming the partner as beneficiary on the employee’s life
insurance, under the employee’s will, or employee’s retirement
annuities and being named by the partner as beneficiary of the
partner’s life insurance, under the partner’s will, or the
partner’s retirement annuities; and
vi. Each agreeing in writing to assume financial responsibility
for the welfare of the other, such as durable power of attorney;
or
vii. Other proof of financial interdependence as approved by
the Director.349

would if each lived alone.” Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 92-231, at 150, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5136). Embedded in this
statement is the assumption that the partners benefit from economies of scale—that they
integrate their finances. Another justification appears to be fraud prevention. See
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975) (noting “[t]he danger of persons entering a
marriage relationship not to enjoy its traditional benefits, but instead to enable one spouse
to claim benefits upon the anticipated early death of the wage earner”).
347. See Blumberg, supra note 29, at 1140–44.
348. See Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799–800 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, Diaz v.
Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth criteria that must be satisfied in order
to obtain health coverage).
349. Id. at 800.
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The Arizona experience demonstrates that nonmarital partners
will identify themselves to claim a discrete benefit and may do so in a
way that reveals characteristics that the law values—in this case,
financial interdependency. Were it available, partners would likely
claim loss of consortium for injuries suffered by the other350 or apply
for benefits like Fair Housing Act loans.351 In doing so, they would
make representations about functions their relationship performs:
that it involves support, financial partnership, stability, etc.
On the flip side, partners make representations about the
absence of a relationship to claim a benefit or avoid an obligation.
These instances, too, provide information about characteristics of the
relationship. For example, the federal government will consider
informal relationships when determining eligibility for SSI benefits or
student loans.352 When applying for these benefits, partners may
proceed as if single, omitting any mention of their relationships. They
may also object to determinations that their relationships should
affect their entitlement to benefits, in the process revealing and
denying critical features.353
If the couple represents that their relationship qualifies for a
right based on a certain characteristic, they often will have consented
to the imposition of obligations based on that characteristic.
Returning to an opening hypothetical, if Camille and David were to
open a joint checking account and name each other as beneficiaries in
their wills and then apply for insurance coverage for David from
Camille’s employer,354 those acts would be strong evidence of pooling
finances that the Social Security Administration could take into
account if one of them applied for SSI benefits. Conversely, if the
state is willing to impose a disability based on that function—i.e.,
mutual financial support—the parties should have a strong claim to
rights that are awarded based on that same function. Equality

350. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Mini Coach of Bos., Inc., 799 N.E.2d 1256, 1256–57
(Mass. 2003) (involving the attempt by a cohabitant in a ten-year relationship to recover
for injuries sustained by her partner).
351. See Let FHA Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/buying/loans [https://perma.cc/UK9Q-FMWX] (explaining FHA
loans are insured by Federal Housing Administration, enabling lenders to “offer
[prospective homeowners] a better deal”).
352. See Aloni, supra note 6, at 1294–95.
353. See, e.g., Dutko v. Colvin, No. 15 CV-10698, 2015 WL 6750792, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 5, 2015) (revealing that the couple had cohabited for over twenty years and that the
applicant received health insurance coverage through her “boyfriend’s” employer and
purchased a house together).
354. Assuming, of course, that such coverage were available.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2018)

2018]

CONSENT TO INTIMATE REGULATION

1081

presupposes that cases that are similar in one normatively relative
respect should be treated the same regarding that respect.355
Admittedly, these functions are too broad to be of immediate
use. For instance, the denial of a student loan to a person in an
informal relationship based on mutual financial dependency and
support does not point to which of the rights based on mutual
financial dependency and support the couple may be entitled (like the
Family Medical Leave Act, Social Security survivors benefits, or state
income tax credits). But as courts, lawmakers, and agencies consider
these claims, they would have the opportunity to define with more
particularity how rights and obligations relate and to generate norms
about what types of acts lead to the imposition of what types of legal
obligations.
This Section shows that the same consent framework that should
guide the determination of inter se obligations between nonmarital
partners provides a new way of thinking about a heretofore vexing
question: when to extend state-provided rights and obligations to
people in informal relationships. An added benefit of this approach is
that it not only enables a more focused inquiry about legal obligations
but minimizes the consequences of error. The trouble with all-ornothing status approaches is that the determination that a couple is in
a marriage-like relationship imposes the full panoply of spousal
property and support obligations.356 When one partner disputes the
creation of legal obligations, the consequence of an adverse
determination is significant. If the question is more particularized—
e.g., whether the couple agreed to share equally in a specific piece of
property or intertwine their finances closely enough that the law
should recognize the standing of one to sue for injuries to the other—
the consequences do not extend as far. A consent framework
promises to create norms around informal relationships while
simultaneously minimizing the potential for significant infringements
on individual rights.

355. Stefan Gosepath, Equality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.1 (June 27, 2007),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/ [https://perma.cc/8EKX-VWU7 (dark archive)];
see also Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 25, at 820 (arguing against the
departure from the principle of symmetry in the law of family obligation without good
cause).
356. As discussed in Section I.B., the Washington and ALI approaches impose the inter
se obligations of marriage. Some proposals go further, treating qualifying couples as
married for all purposes. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 13, at 222; Waggoner, supra note
21, at 241.
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CONCLUSION
Informal relationships pose a complicated regulatory puzzle: to
do nothing will leave people without legal protections that, at least in
the context of marriage, are thought to strengthen relationships and
protect vulnerable partners; to do too much will impose obligations
against the will of one or both partners. If it is going to regulate these
relationships at all, the law must decide what rights and obligations to
impose, and when in the relationship these rights should begin.
Proxies like cohabitation or the duration of the relationship are vastly
over- and under-inclusive. The insistence that obligations flow only
from the will of the parties has also led to implementation problems.
This Article has demonstrated that the answers to the puzzle must
consider consent, not ignore it.
Reclaiming the concept of consent and defining it is the first step
to solving the puzzle. But it only raises other important questions. A
key benefit of formality is administrability—formalities provide a
convenient means to identify those to whom rights should flow.357
Any attempt to regulate informal relationships will have to contend
with the burdens of providing such recognition. Although there was
some fear that recognizing Marvin-type claims would overwhelm the
courts,358 those fears have not come to pass. Yet if the regulatory
system were more effective at recognizing rights, it stands to reason
that more people would attempt to establish them. Further, courts
and lawmakers would have to generate standards by which to assess
the parties’ conduct, raising questions about resources as well as
comparative institutional competency. And this all presupposes that
the law should regulate informal relationships. The descriptive work
in Part I reveals that there may be reasons to recognize certain types
of relationships—for instance, relationships involving significant
income disparity and resultant dependency on the part of one
partner—but not others, like those involving lower-income
individuals for whom recognition could result in deprivation of
property rights and valuable benefits. Accompanying the question of
when to regulate is the question of whether the state should do so.359
These interconnected questions deserve further attention.
357. See Clarke, supra note 16, at 771–72 (noting that formalities streamline decision
making).
358. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123–24 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (Clark, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (speculating that allowing express and implied contract claims
between cohabitants would “surely generate undue burdens on our trial courts”).
359. See Krause, supra note 43, at 297 (calling this the “ultimate question on the road
to partnership legislation” but declining to answer it).
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Lest these daunting questions stall the endeavor in its tracks, I
close by focusing on the benefits of a consent approach to informal
relationship recognition. Approaching regulation through the lens of
consent provides the impetus to identify the various packages of
rights and duties and to identify the conduct relevant to those rights
and duties. It also reveals the ways in which those rights are only
incompletely provided to unmarried partners, highlighting the nature
and injustice of their exclusion. And it provides insights into the
dominant regulatory form of intimate relationships, marriage. If one
size does not fit all nonmarital relationships, those insights provide
additional reasons to question whether the law optimally regulates
marriage.
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